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ARTICLES
De- and Re-constructing Public
Governance for Biodiversity
Conservation
Alejandro E. Camacho*
To argue that the current extinction event could be averted
if people just cared more and were willing to make more
sacrifices is not wrong, exactly; still, it misses the point. It
doesn’t much matter whether people care or don’t care.
What matters is that people change the world.
—Elizabeth Kolbert1
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INTRODUCTION
Is biodiversity loss wicked? What has been done about it? And
how might public governance be altered to improve the prognosis? A
substantial and growing number of scholars have sought to define and
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characterize incredibly complex social problems, alternatively labelled
as “messes,”2 “swamp[s],”3 “massive,”4 “wicked,”5 or even “super
wicked” problems.6
Biodiversity loss, or the decline in variation among genes,
species, and functional traits in a particular area,7 has been
characterized by some as a classic wicked problem.8 Scientists agree on
an ongoing biodiversity crisis worldwide.9 Though the focus is often on
species extinction risk,10 other indicators of biodiversity, including
ecosystem extent and condition, biotic integrity, and total biomass, have
all deteriorated sharply from the prehistorical baseline.11 Other major
dangers include the rising losses in genetic diversity within species
(reducing resilience to the effects of climate change due to fewer
potential favorable adaptations),12 functional diversity (or the presence
of multiple species that fulfill similar roles in an ecosystem), and overall
ecosystem function (or the benefits or services that an ecosystem
provides).13 The challenges in defining the problem and potential
2.
Russell L. Ackoff, The Art and Science of Mess Management, 11 INTERFACES 20, 22 (1981).
3.
DONALD A. SCHÖN, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN
FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS 3 (1987).
4.
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 64 (2010).
5.
See, e.g., Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160–61 (1973).
6.
See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009).
7.
Bradley J. Cardinale, J. Emmett Duffy, Andrew Gonzalez, David U. Hooper, Charles
Perrings, Patrick Venail, Anita Narwani, Georgina M. Mace, David Tilman, David A. Wardle, Ann
P. Kinzig, Gretchen C. Daily, Michel Loreau, James B. Grace, Anne Larigauderie, Diane S.
Srivastava & Shahid Naeem, Biodiversity Loss and Its Impact on Humanity, 486 NATURE 59, 60
(2012). Biodiversity loss thus includes species extinction but more broadly consists of any decline
from the genetic to the ecological scale. See id.; see also infra Section V.A.
8.
See, e.g., Martin Sharman & Musa C. Mlambo, Wicked: The Problem of Biodiversity Loss,
21 GAIA 274, 274 (2012).
9.
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCI.-POL’Y PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM
SERVS., SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF THE IPBES GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT ON
BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 10–12 (2019) [hereinafter IPBES SUMMARY].
10. See id. at 24 (reporting that approximately 12.5 percent of all species worldwide are
threatened with extinction).
11. See id. at 25 (reporting that ecosystem extent and condition has declined by forty-seven
percent on average, biotic integrity in terrestrial communities by twenty-three percent, and global
biomass of wild mammals by eighty-two percent).
12. See id. at 25–26 (reporting that “[t]en per[ ]cent of domesticated breeds of mammals were
recorded as extinct,” and genetic diversity in wild species worldwide has declined an average of
one percent per decade since the mid-nineteenth century); see also M. Bálint, S. Domisch, C.H.M.
Engelhardt, P. Haase, S. Lehrian, J. Sauer, K. Theissinger, S.U. Pauls & C. Nowak, Cryptic
Biodiversity Loss Linked to Global Climate Change, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 313, 317 (2011).
13. See IPBES SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 22 (discussing the fact that the “deterioration of
nature and consequent disruption of benefits to people has both direct and indirect implications”
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solutions, the multiplicity and interconnectivity of drivers and
consequences, as well as other features of biodiversity loss have led
scholars to consider it wicked and even super wicked.14
A more useful question, however, might be how much does the
wicked label matter. Some criticize the wicked problem nomenclature
as merely a rhetorical turn: an increasingly, and perhaps
indiscriminately, used shorthand for identifying very complicated, and
perhaps even intractable, problems.15 Indeed, a wicked label is likely
only relevant if such a designation helps formulate approaches for
addressing the problem.
Perhaps the essential inquiry, then, is what can be done to
manage the dilemma. Some do consider the wicked problem tag to be
valuable for identifying effective responses,16 including for managing
biodiversity loss.17 Undoubtedly, proposals for untangling wicked
problems abound. Virtually all of these proposals, however, focus on the
procedural facets of public governance, with a procession of scholars
offering ways to improve decisionmaking processes to rein in
wicked problems.18
While some attention to process may be warranted, managing
complex problems like biodiversity loss also requires consideration of
other core elements of governance. Governance can best be understood
as having substantive, procedural, and structural facets.19 As Professor
for various aspects of society); see also Jae R. Pasari, Taal Levi, Erika S. Zavaleta & David Tilman,
Several Scales of Biodiversity Affect Ecosystem Multifunctionality, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
10219, 10219 (2013).
14. See infra Section I.A.
15. See, e.g., Nick Turnbull & Robert Hoppe, Problematizing ‘Wickedness’: A Critique of the
Wicked Problems Concept, from Philosophy to Practice, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 315, 316 (2019)
(describing “rhetorical appeal” of wicked terminology “as when used by practitioners to avoid
blame for policy failure, or to draw attention and resources to certain problems”); id. at 333; B.
Guy Peters, What Is So Wicked About Wicked Problems? A Conceptual Analysis and a Research
Program, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 385, 386 (2017) (“[D]escribing [difficult] policy problems as wicked
problems has become a fad in the academic literature.”); John Alford & Brian W. Head, Wicked
and Less Wicked Problems: A Typology and a Contingency Framework, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 397, 398
(2017) (“[T]he term ‘wicked problem’ has become inflated and over-used.”).
16. See, e.g., Catrien J.A.M. Termeer, Art Dewulf & Robbert Biesbroek, A Critical
Assessment of the Wicked Problem Concept: Relevance and Usefulness for Policy Science and
Practice, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 167, 176 (2019) (“[T]he concept of wicked problems has important
rhetorical effects in research and practice.”).
17. See, e.g., Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 274 (“[I]t is crucial to understand
biodiversity loss as a wicked problem[ ] in order to facilitate innovative and comprehensive
approaches to dealing with it.”).
18. See infra Section I.B.
19. See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How
Program Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L.
REV. 711, 724–34 (2016) [hereinafter Legal Adaptive Capacity] (defining the substantive and
procedural components of legal adaptive capacity); ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO & ROBERT L.
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J.B. Ruhl has noted, it is “important to distinguish between the
resilience of the legal system’s underlying structure and processes and
the stability of the substantive content of law.”20 Each of these facets
affects the legal system’s adaptive capacity to manage complexity and
uncertainty—in other words, to cope with wickedness. Policymakers
might more effectively tackle wicked problems like biodiversity loss by
reconstructing public governance to enhance not only procedural but
also substantive and structural legal adaptive capacity.
This Article deconstructs the substantive, procedural, and
structural components of public governance in the United States to
explain how the existing legal infrastructure lacks the legal adaptive
capacity to manage the wickedness of biodiversity loss. That is,
particularly in the context of global anthropogenic climate change, the
substantive goals and tools of public action, the processes used by
governmental institutions to advance such goals and implement such
tools, and the structure of allocated authority among public institutions
have been devised in ways that make biodiversity loss virtually
impossible to tackle meaningfully.
First, the substantive goals of natural resources law are not
primarily directed at promoting biodiversity or broader notions of
ecological health.21 Indeed, the range of tools conventionally employed
for achieving such regulatory goals are primarily directed at one of
several objectives that, at best, have only indirectly been aimed at
promoting some version of biodiversity: minimizing direct human harm
or other interventions, maintaining historical conditions, or
maximizing resource yield. The few more recent interventions that are
better directed at promoting ecological health remain rare and
inadequate. As a result, it would be misleading to state that we have
even attempted to address the biodiversity crisis through governance in
any meaningful way.
Second, public biodiversity governance lacks procedural legal
adaptive capacity. The conventional regulatory and management
processes adopted for advancing prevailing natural resource goals and
for deciding when and how to employ such strategies are insufficiently
tethered to managing both the uncertainties and the dynamics
accompanying ecological phenomena.22 Significant opportunities
GLICKSMAN, REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT: A FUNCTIONAL AND DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK
236–37 (2019) [hereinafter REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT] (distinguishing structural legal
adaptive capacity).
20. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal
Systems—with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2011).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
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remain for adapting biodiversity governance to be better directed at
promoting learning, reducing uncertainty, and adjusting strategies as
ecological conditions shift and managers gain information.
Third, the configuration of authority among institutional actors
charged with implementing natural resources law remains
underexplored and deficient.23 There has been insufficient attention
directed at parsing and adjusting the structure of governance.
Unfortunately, authority over natural resources management and
regulation has remained largely fragmented into many decentralized,
overlapping, and poorly coordinated institutions. Tailored alterations to
the allocation of authority over natural resources can leverage key
advantages of centralized and/or coordinated institutions while
maintaining the largely decentralized, independent, and overlapping
character of public biodiversity governance.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly describes how
addressing biodiversity loss is a particularly complex challenge—part
of a super wicked crisis, in light of global anthropogenic climate
change.24 Unfortunately, the wicked problems literature provides only
limited help for assessing existing governance or envisioning
alternatives more attuned to the problem.
Accordingly, the Article focuses on how conservation laws have
been designed in ways that make biodiversity loss impossible to
address. It does so by deconstructing public governance—separating
out substantive regulatory goals and strategies from its processes and
the structural allocation of regulatory authority. The focus is the United
States, though other regimes are likely subject to similar deficiencies.25
Part II considers how, particularly in the context of global
anthropogenic climate change, U.S. natural resources governance has
lacked the substantive legal adaptive capacity to meaningfully manage
biodiversity loss. Part III details the limitations of public biodiversity
governance processes. Part IV explores the inadequacy of the existing
configuration of authority among the primary public institutions
charged with managing ecological resources. Finally, Part V offers a
preliminary reconstruction of public biodiversity governance,
explaining how the United States might reframe public institutions to
better address biodiversity loss.26
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part I.
25. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Managing Ecosystem Effects in an Era of Rapid Climate
Change, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, VOL. 1: CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 555,
558 (Michael Faure ed., 2016) (describing the limited adaptive capacity of governance in the United
States and European Union to manage climate change’s ecological effects).
26. See infra Part V.
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I. THE WICKEDNESS OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS
A. Biodiversity Loss as a Wicked Problem
Biodiversity loss appears to be particularly wicked. The seminal
articulation of “wicked problems” offered ten characteristics, though the
last is idiosyncratic to the urban planning context: (1) no definitive
formulation; (2) no stopping rule; (3) solutions are not true-or-false, but
good-or-bad; (4) no immediate and ultimate test of solutions; (5)
solutions are “one-shot operations”; (6) innumerable potential solutions;
(7) uniqueness; (8) problem is symptomatic of other problem(s); (9)
discrepancies in representing, explaining, and thus solving the
problem; and (10) planners are responsible for the consequences of their
actions.27 Subsequent scholarship has generalized and distilled these
components, though not often in consistent ways.28 Some added the
more selective category of “super wicked problems,” for which also “time
is running out; those who cause the problem also seek to provide a
solution; the central authority needed to address them is weak or nonexistent; and irrational discounting occurs that pushes responses into
the future.”29 Meanwhile, Professors Ruhl and Salzman categorize
“massive” problems based on the attributes of causal sources, causal
mechanisms, and cumulative effects.30
Analysis of these criteria suggests that biodiversity loss likely
qualifies as a wicked, perhaps a super wicked, problem. A number of
commenters, albeit with limited explanation, have concluded as such,
particularly in conjunction with global anthropogenic climate change.31
As stated by one scholar,
[T]hreats to global biodiversity, against the approaching beat of a changing climate[,] . . .
have created a set of “wicked problems,” that are messy, intractable, subject to multiple

27. Rittel & Webber, supra note 5, at 161–67.
28. One literature synthesis states wicked problems are (1) indefinable, (2) ambiguous and
interconnected, (3) temporally challenging, (4) repercussive, (5) doubly hermeneutic, and (6)
morally consequential. D. Duckett, D. Feliciano, J. Martin-Ortega & J. Munoz-Rojas, Tackling
Wicked Environmental Problems: The Discourse and Its Influence on Praxis in Scotland, 154
LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 44, 45 (2016). Others emphasize dimensions of complexity, uncertainty,
and divergence. Brian W. Head, Wicked Problems in Public Policy, 3 PUB. POL’Y 101, 103 (2008).
Several focus on features of cross-disciplinarity and need for collaboration. See, e.g., Sandra A.
Waddock, Educating Holistic Professionals in a World of Wicked Problems, 2 APPLIED
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 40, 43 (1998).
29. Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein & Graeme Auld, Overcoming the
Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate
Change, 45 POL’Y SCIS. 123, 124 (2012).
30. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 73.
31. See, e.g., Catherine Allan, Can Adaptive Management Help Us Embrace the MurrayDarling Basin’s Wicked Problems?, in ADAPTIVE AND INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT: COPING

2–Camacho_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

1592

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

12/12/20 11:30 AM

[Vol. 73:6:1585

interpretations, and for which solutions at present are not evident or inscrutable. Dealing
with the causes and consequences of biodiversity loss in a changing environment is one
such problem.32

The relevant classic factors suggest a strong case for global and
local biodiversity loss as wicked. Biodiversity, and its consequent loss,
is well recognized as a challenging concept to formulate.33 The causal
chains linking different ecosystem components are complex, dynamic,
nonlinear, and unpredictable.34 Promoting biodiversity conservation is
a normative proposition.35 Though there likely are many possible
strategies for combatting biodiversity loss, a definitive criterion for
demonstrating success is illusive.36 Both the study and implementation
of strategies for reducing biodiversity loss can influence and alter the
problem.37 There are countless possible, contestable social responses for
reducing or restoring biodiversity, particularly as influenced by climate
change.38 The particular risk of irreversibility makes biodiversity loss
distinctive,39 and biodiversity loss is certainly symptomatic of deeper
problems, including climate change40 and unsustainable development.41
Finally, failures to address biodiversity loss are subject to “widely
divergent explanations.”42
COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY 61, 64 (Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Pavel Kabat & Jörn Möltgen
eds., 2008); Ruth DeFries & Harini Nagendra, Ecosystem Management as a Wicked Problem, 356
SCIENCE 265, 266 (2017).
32. Kent H. Redford, William Adams & Georgina M. Mace, Synthetic Biology and
Conservation of Nature: Wicked Problems and Wicked Solutions, PLOS BIOLOGY, vol. 11, Apr. 2013,
at 1, 1.
33. See Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 275 (“ ‘Biodiversity’ is notoriously difficult to
define, and the differences are often significant.”); Daniel P. Faith, Biodiversity, STAN. ENCYC.
PHIL. (Jun. 11, 2003), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/biodiversity/ [https://perma.cc/9N7CBFJW] (examining the varied and often conflicting ways in which scholars define “biodiversity”);
see also infra notes 277–287 and accompanying text.
34. DeFries & Nagendra, supra note 31, at 257.
35. See Paul Roebuck & Paul Phifer, The Persistence of Positivism in Conservation Biology,
13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 444 (1999) (arguing that biodiversity conservation is rooted primarily
in ethics and should reverse the trend of a focus on fact verification and falsification).
36. Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 275.
37. Id. at 276.
38. Id.; Terry L. Root, Diana Liverman & Chris Newman, Managing Biodiversity in the Light
of Climate Change: Current Biological Effects and Future Impacts, in KEY TOPICS IN
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 85, 100 (David W. Macdonald & Katrina Service eds., 2007).
39. Faith, supra note 33.
40. Root et al., supra note 38, at 85 (“[P]redicted changes in global and regional climates as
a result of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide have tremendous implications for species and
habitat conservation.”); ALLISTER SLINGENBERG, LEON BRAAT, HENNY VAN DER WINDT, KOEN
RADEMAEKERS, LISA EICHLER & KERRY TURNER, STUDY ON UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF
BIODIVERSITY LOSS AND THE POLICY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 54 (2009) (“Biodiversity and
climate change are closely inter-linked, and each impacts upon the other . . . .”).
41. SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 13.
42. Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 276.
WITH
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In fact, biodiversity loss, particularly as it is fundamentally
linked to global climate change, meets the additional criteria of a super
wicked problem. Time is of the essence in light of rapid declines, and no
single authority is charged with managing the problem.43 Moreover, the
primary perpetrators are those in the best position to address it (and
have little incentive to do so).44
Similarly, Ruhl and Salzman’s framework—considering the
causal sources, causal mechanisms, and cumulative effects—suggests
biodiversity loss, again linked to climate change, is an especially
massive problem.45 First, the stressors that lead to biodiversity loss—
including direct stressors like human development46 and more indirect
ones such as invasive species,47 habitat fragmentation,48 and,
increasingly, global anthropogenic climate change49—are many,
diverse, dispersed, and quite variable.50 Moreover, the causal
mechanisms of biodiversity loss occur on multiple governance and
geographic scales;51 are often latent;52 and can be complex, nonlinear,
intertwined, and attenuated.53 Finally, the many disparate,
43.
44.
45.
46.

Lazarus, supra note 6, at 1160.
Id. at 1160–61.
See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 73–79.
Alexander Wood, An Emerging Consensus on Biodiversity Loss, in THE ROOT CAUSES OF
BIODIVERSITY LOSS 1, 5 (Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edwards & Johanna Mang eds., 2000)
(“[H]abitat alteration is clearly the predominant cause and is a problem that operates at the local
scale.”); SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 13.
47. Wood, supra note 46, at 5; SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 56.
48. SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 13, 29.
49. See Wood, supra note 46, at 5; SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 54.
50.
Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 276.
51. See, e.g., J.A. Puppim de Oliveira, O. Balaban, C.N.H. Doll, R. Moreno-Peñaranda, A.
Gasparatos, D. Iossifova & A. Suwa, Cities and Biodiversity: Perspectives and Governance
Challenges for Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) at the City Level, 144
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1302, 1303 (2011); Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The
International Legal Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L.
& POL’Y 111, 113–14 (1996); Duckett et al., supra note 28, at 44–45.
52. See Mikko Kuussaari, Riccardo Bommarco, Risto K. Heikkinen, Aveliina Helm, Jochen
Krauss, Regina Lindborg, Erik Öckinger, Meelis Pärtel, Joan Pino, Ferran Rodà, Constantí
Stefanescu, Tiit Teder, Martin Zobel & Ingolf Steffan-Dewenter, Extinction Debt: A Challenge for
Biodiversity Conservation, 24 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 564, 564 (2009) (highlighting “a
notable increase in awareness of delayed extinctions, also called extinction debt, as an important
factor to consider in biodiversity conservation”).
53. See e.g., Justin Kitzes, Eric Berlow, Erin Conlisk, Karlheinz Erb, Katsunori Iha, Neo
Martinez, Erica A. Newman, Christoph Plutzar, Adam B. Smith & John Harte, ConsumptionBased Conservation Targeting: Linking Biodiversity Loss to Upstream Demand Through a Global
Wildlife Footprint, 10 CONSERVATION LETTERS 531, 531 (2016) (“[P]roximate causes of biodiversity
loss, however, are themselves driven by upstream economic activities.”); Chris D. Thomas, Alison
Cameron, Rhys E. Green, Michel Bakkenes, Linda J. Beaumont, Yvonne C. Collingham, Barend
F.N. Erasmus, Marinez Ferreira de Siqueira, Alan Grainger, Lee Hannah, Lesley Hughes, Brian
Huntley, Albert S. van Jaarsveld, Guy F. Midgley, Lera Miles, Miguel A. Ortega-Huerta, A.
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incremental, and long-term effects that lead to biodiversity loss can be
difficult to identify, measure, and reverse,54 and occur intermittently
and sporadically.55 In fact, in light of global climate change’s pervasive
influence on the various causes of biodiversity loss,56 it is likely part of
the most complex archetype of massive problems identified by Ruhl and
Salzman—the policy jungle.57
B. Managing Wickedness
The literature on wicked problems provides some, albeit
incomplete, direction for designing public governance to better manage
complex problems such as biodiversity loss. Numerous scholars have
developed intricate proposals for addressing wicked problems through
facilitated planning and dispute resolution—termed alternatively as an
“issue-based information system,”58 “dialogue mapping,”59 “problem
structuring methods,”60 “general morphological analysis,”61 “systems

Townsend Peterson, Oliver L. Phillips & Stephen E. Williams, Extinction Risk from Climate
Change, 427 NATURE 145, 147 (2004) (stating that most severe effects on biodiversity will be from
interactions between threats to biodiversity, rather than threats like climate change “acting
in isolation”).
54. See SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 13 (listing the many factors that can all
contribute to biodiversity loss).
55. Id. at 56.
56. Thomas et al., supra note 53, at 147.
57. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 88 (defining policy jungles as cumulative effects
problems that combine the attributes of feedback, discontinuity, and spaghetti bowl problems).
58. See, e.g., Werner Kunz & Horst W.J. Rittel, Issues as Elements of Information Systems 1
(Inst. for Urb. & Reg’l Dev., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 131, 1970),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.134.1741&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/K73K-VDMV] (offering an “Issue-Based Information System” (IBIS) to help
stakeholders coordinate to manage complex problems).
59. See, e.g., JEFF CONKLIN, DIALOGUE MAPPING: BUILDING SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF
WICKED PROBLEMS 19 (2005) (proposing “dialogue mapping,” based on IBIS, as a facilitated process
for bringing stakeholders together to “generate coherence around wicked problems”).
60. See, e.g., Jonathan Rosenhead, What’s the Problem? An Introduction to Problem
Structuring Methods, 26 INTERFACES 117, 119 (1996) (suggesting a group problem-solving process
that integrates multiple perspectives, transparency, and relationship building).
61. See, e.g., Tom Ritchey, Wicked Problems: Modelling Social Messes with Morphological
Analysis, 2 ACTA MORPHOLOGICA GENERALIS 1, 5–6 (2013) (proposing a group-facilitated and
iterative “General Morphological Analysis” problem-solving process “attuned to the methodological
issues of wicked problems”).
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thinking” and “agile methodology,”62 or “mess mapping.”63 Though often
short on how they might apply in different contexts, these generalizable
frameworks focus on outlining templates for tackling complexity
through intricate problem-solving processes. An overlapping literature
originating in the ecological sciences has developed and studied how
adaptive management and resilience theory can help managers better
understand and tackle socio-ecological problems.64
Both of these literatures thus largely focus on the procedural
aspect of governance, and as important as that component might be, it
is not everything. Only a few wicked problems scholars explore
institutional or structural mechanisms, and even then they are
typically fused with procedural strategies.65 Similarly, although the
more robust adaptive management literature provides a useful
framework for assessing and adjusting governance to manage
uncertainties in decisionmaking, adaptive management largely
emphasizes procedural and, to a much more limited extent, structural
features of governance for managing complexity and change.66 In short,
the wicked tag, to date, has provided incomplete guidance for assessing
and adjusting governance.
A more comprehensive review of not only the procedural but also
the substantive and structural aspects of public governance is needed
to get a complete picture of how well governmental institutions have
been devised to manage wicked problems. As further detailed in Parts
II, III, and IV, the substantive goals and strategies, processes, and
structure of public biodiversity governance are each not well designed
to either tackle biodiversity loss or manage change. Unfortunately, this
62. See, e.g., Euphemia Wong, What Is a Wicked Problem and How Can You Solve It?,
INTERACTION DESIGN FOUND., https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/wickedproblems-5-steps-to-help-you-tackle-wicked-problems-by-combining-systems-thinking-with-agilemethodology (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y9MV-K2LW] (proposing “systems
thinking” process as “perfect for wicked problems” when paired with “agile methodology,” an
“iterative approach” that “helps to improve solutions through collaboration”).
63. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HORN & ROBERT P. WEBER, STRATEGY KINETICS, NEW TOOLS FOR
RESOLVING WICKED PROBLEMS: MESS MAPPING AND RESOLUTION MAPPING PROCESSES 5 (2007),
https://www.strategykinetics.com//New_Tools_For_Resolving_Wicked_Problems.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/8VA9-YDBM] (recommending “mess mapping” for problem solving “so that stakeholders
arrive at a common framework for understanding these problems”).
64.
See, e.g., C.J.A.M. Termeer, A. Dewulf, S.I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, M. Vink & M. van
Vliet, Coping with the Wicked Problem of Climate Adaptation Across Scales: The Five R Governance
Capabilities, 154 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 11, 14 (2016) (describing resilience, among other
features, as crucial to governance of wicked problems). See infra notes 183–190 and
accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 205–208 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18–27 (2014) (describing adaptive management and strategies
for better accommodating it in regulatory processes).
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review reveals that these limitations are particularly evident and
problematic in light of global anthropogenic climate change.67
II. THE GOALS AND TOOLS OF PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE
Though the wicked problems literature has not explored how
substantive governance might be reshaped to better manage
wickedness, natural resources law has certainly instituted a range of
substantive strategies aimed at reducing certain causes of biodiversity
loss. Statutes at various governmental scales have conventionally
focused on regulating prospective development, reserving lands for
various purposes, or restricting invasive species. While these largely
preservationist strategies may have always been imperfect proxies for
biodiversity conservation, they are particularly inadequate for
curtailing biodiversity loss in the context of global climate change. Even
more flexible passive management strategies—such as public lands
focused on maximizing yield, wildlife corridors, and private
conservation incentives—are only partly tethered to promoting
biodiversity in light of large-scale shifts in ecological conditions. As a
result, natural resources law has limited substantive legal adaptive
capacity, and those goals and strategies that are more accommodating
of change are not directed primarily at maximizing prospective
biodiversity conservation.
A. Regulate Development Causing Future Biodiversity Loss
The most direct strategy employed today for promoting species
conservation in the United States may be the regulation of private and
public development.68 This strategy has primarily focused on promoting
a particular aspect of biodiversity—namely, preventing species
extinction and, to a lesser extent, avoiding species from being in danger
of going extinct.69 The chief strategy for achieving this end has been to

67. See Daniel Schramm & Akiva Fishman, Legal Frameworks for Adaptive Natural
Resource Management in a Changing Climate, 22 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 491, 497 (2010)
(arguing that weaknesses in the ability of legal regimes to respond to climate change “stem from
both rigidity in the administrative procedures of the law and the absence of mandates to achieve
long-term tangible objectives”).
68. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA
HEINZERLING, DAVID A. WIRTH & NOAH D. HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 422–23 (5th ed. 2016).
69. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (aiming “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a
program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species”).
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prevent or minimize affirmative, relatively direct human actions that
would harm designated species.
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) is the clearest example of
this strategy. Congress enacted the ESA to promote “better
safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation’s heritage in fish,
wildlife, and plants,”70 recognizing that many vulnerable species are of
“esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific
value.”71 In addition, the ESA declares as a primary purpose not only
the protection of endangered species but also the conservation of the
ecosystems upon which such species depend.72
However, the key regulatory hooks of the ESA—sections 7, 9,
and 10—are all reactive, each placing restrictions on human activity
that affirmatively harms species listed as threatened or endangered.73
Section 7 prohibits any federal action74 that would “jeopardize the
continued existence”75 of any listed species or result in the modification
of its “critical habitat.”76 Section 9 strictly prohibits the “take” of any
endangered species by any person, public or private.77 The statute
broadly extends the stringent ban on taking to include “harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt
to engage in any such conduct,”78 and subsequent judicial opinions have
upheld expansive regulatory interpretations of this language to include
the substantial modification of habitat.79 Each of these restrictions

70. Id. § 1531(a)(5).
71. Id. § 1531(a)(3).
72. See id. § 1531(b); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 699–700 (1995) (acknowledging that the ESA serves to protect vulnerable ecosystems,
with listed species functioning as an indicator that the underlying ecosystem is faltering).
73. Listing is based on an assessment of the risk of extinction that relies on “the best
scientific and commercial data available.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
74. Action includes any activity “authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by
Federal agencies.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2019).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a). See also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (finding
jeopardy determination must be made strictly without regard to costs and benefits of the proposed
agency action).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
77. Id. § 1538(a)(1). For threatened species, the take prohibition is not automatic; the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service may apply the ban at its discretion, see id. § 1533(d), which it has done
in most cases. See TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES
AND URBAN GROWTH 17 (1994).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
79. See Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981) (defining
“harm” “to include activity that results in significant environmental modification or degradation
of the endangered animal's habitat”); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.,
515 U.S. 687, 965 (1995) (finding that the secretary of the interior acted reasonably in
“promulgat[ing] a regulation that defines the [ESA’s] prohibition on takings to include ‘significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife’ ”).
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focuses primarily on limiting relatively direct human actions that cause
biodiversity loss and secondarily on guarding fragmented habitat,
rather than fostering species recovery, comprehensive ecosystem
conservation, or other measures of biodiversity.80
Even section 10, often lauded as a way to promote more
comprehensive constructions of ecosystem conservation, focuses on
minimizing direct harm to listed species. Added later to the ESA to
allow the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”)81—collectively referred to here as
“the Services” or individually as “the Service”—to issue “incidental
take” permits, section 10 allows private and public permittees to harm
or even destroy members of a protected species if incidental82 and
undertaken in conjunction with an approved habitat conservation plan
(“HCP”).83 Notably, this change to the ESA expressly allows biodiversity
loss so long as (1) the harm’s impacts are mitigated “to the maximum
extent practicable,” (2) the applicant provides “adequate” funding, (3)
the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species is not “appreciably”
reduced, and (4) the plan includes any other “necessary or
appropriate” measures.84
A number of permittees have agreed to design their HCPs not
merely to restrict development but also to consider a more expansive
biodiversity focus, including managing indirect stressors such as
invasive species or habitat fragmentation.85 Moreover, some HCPs have
focused on protecting not only specifically listed species but also other
vulnerable species, habitat, or ecological communities.86
80. See LAURA HOOD, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3 (1998); Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning: Certainly
Empowered, Somewhat Deliberative, Questionably Democratic, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 105, 107 (2001).
81. The ESA is primarily administered by the secretary of the interior through the FWS for
land and freshwater species and by the secretary of commerce through the National Marine
Fisheries Service for marine species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (defining “secretary”); id.
§ 1533(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 424.01 (2019) (FWS-NMFS joint regulations).
82. An “incidental take” is broadly defined as any taking “that result[s] from, but [is] not the
purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity conducted by the Federal agency or
applicant.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
83. The Services may issue a permit to private or non-federal public actors that authorize
the incidental take of a listed species in conjunction with an approved habitat conservation plan
(“HCP”). 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). Federal agencies and federal permittees can also circumvent the
section 9 prohibitions if the Service issues an incidental take statement (“ITS”) through the section
7 interagency consultation process. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1539(a)(1)(B).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2).
85. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 303, 305 (2007).
86. See William Vogel & Lorin Hicks, Multi-species HCPs: Experiments with the Ecosystem
Approach, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/bulletins/
multi-species-hcp.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2012) [https://perma.cc/45HP-VDU2] (describing
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Nonetheless, even these plans still remain directed at promoting
a static conception of preexisting biotic communities or assemblages
and are not tethered to conceptions of ecological health that internalize
ecological change.87 In fact, the ESA is focused on conservation that is
largely (though not exclusively) directed at maintaining biodiversity
where it historically was and resisting change.88 Moreover, the chief
U.S. legal regime for promoting biodiversity conservation is not focused
on actively addressing many of the conventional cumulative stressors
leading to biodiversity loss. Indeed, many have recognized the ESA’s
emphasis on preventing development has had limited success in
reversing most of the stressors causing biodiversity loss.89
Notably, ESA section 4 does generally require the Services to
develop and implement recovery plans for the conservation and survival
of listed species.90 Plans include a range of strategies for recovering and
ultimately delisting endangered species, including “restoring and
acquiring habitat, removing invasive species, conducting surveys,
monitoring individual populations, and breeding species in captivity to
release them into their historic range.”91 Critically, however, recovery
plans are unenforceable guidance, so that “no agency or entity is
required by the ESA to implement actions in a recovery plan.”92
Moreover, most plans lack sufficient funding for carrying out planned
recovery measures.93 Finally, by design, adopted recovery plans focus
on accomplishing recovery of a particular listed species, not the broader
fitness of particular ecosystems or ecological functions. Though
recovery of listed species would improve or at least maintain species
biodiversity, even full implementation of a recovery plan (and thus
recovery of a listed species) may not stem other significant biodiversity
concerns (such as the health of non-listed species or ecological functions
not directly tethered to the listed species).

HCPs used to restore aquatic habitats, protect caves, and accomplish other objectives beyond solely
protecting listed species).
87. Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-extinction, Dualisms, and
Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 849, 878 (2015).
88. Id.
89. Camacho, supra note 85, at 346 & n.309.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
91. Endangered Species Recovery Program, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (June 2011),
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/recovery.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PYX-SD6V].
92. Recovery: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/whatwe-do/recovery-overview.html (last updated June 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/B3HT-LQVD].
93. Alejandro E. Camacho, Michael Robinson-Dorn, Asena Cansu Yildiz & Tara Teegarden,
Assessing State Laws and Resources for Endangered Species Protection, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10837, 10842–43 (2017).
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This is tied to another limitation of the ESA: it is primarily
focused on goals other than ecological health or productivity. As I have
argued elsewhere, the ESA’s conception of biodiversity is largely linked
to historical preservation—protecting or restoring species where they
are or used to be—and secondarily on wildness preservation, or limiting
human intervention in ecological processes.94 Even the ESA is reticent
to allow interventions designed to promote future ecological function or
health, with the few more active strategies used (such as captive
breeding and translocations) focused primarily on restoration and
not on advancing ecological health in light of anticipated
climatic conditions.95
B. Reserving, Preserving, and/or Restoring Land
The dominant public biodiversity conservation strategy in the
United States, and even globally, may not be regulation of development
but rather reserved lands—setting aside public lands and managing
them to promote conservation.96 About twenty-eight percent of all land
in the United States is federally owned and managed,97 with additional
state lands augmenting this number. Most of this land is set aside for a
range of natural resource purposes that historically have been
understood as, at least in part, promoting the conservation of
biodiversity.98 But it is increasingly clear that these core
management goals are at best imperfect surrogates for, and

94. Camacho, supra note 87, at 878–79. The term “historical preservation,” used here to
describe ecological preservation or restoration to a historical baseline, is related to but
distinguishable from “historic preservation,” employed in other contexts (such as certain programs
of the National Park Service) focused on the built environment and resources primarily of
significance to American history or prehistory. See, e.g., 54 U.S.C. § 302101 (establishing the
National Register of Historic Places).
95. Camacho, supra note 87, at 878–79.
96. See, e.g., Terry L. Erwin, An Evolutionary Basis for Conservation Strategies, 253 SCIENCE
750, 750 (1991) (“National parks, wildlife refuges, biosphere reserves, military reserves, Indian
reservations, and other forms of legally protected areas have been established for aesthetic,
political, or practical purposes in the last 150 years.”); C.R. Margules & R.L. Pressey, Systematic
Conservation Planning, 405 NATURE 243, 243 (2000) (describing the ancient human practice of
preserving lands and the basic role of modern reserves); Frank J. Rahel, Britta Bierwagen &
Yoshinori Taniguchi, Managing Aquatic Species of Conservation Concern in the Face of Climate
Change and Invasive Species, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 551, 552 (2008) (discussing how reserves
“are the mainstay of current conservation efforts”).
97. ROSS W. GORTE, CAROL HARDY VINCENT, LAURA A. HANSON & MARC R. ROSENBLUM,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 3 (2012),
https://cdn.cnsnews.com/documents/FEDERAL%20OWNERSHIP%20OF%20LAND-CRS2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BXX-6RKQ].
98. The most significant exception is the approximately nineteen million acres of land
managed by the Department of Defense. Id. at 1, 13.

2–Camacho_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE & BIODIVERSITY

12/12/20 11:30 AM

1601

perhaps even antagonistic to, long-term ecological health and
biodiversity conservation.
Federal public lands have been set aside for a range of natural
resource uses and goals. One hundred and ninety-three million acres of
national forests are managed by the United States Forest Service
(“USFS”) pursuant to the National Forest Management Act.99 Nearly
248 million acres of Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) land is
managed under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976.100 The national park system is managed by the National Park
Service (“NPS”), which most prominently includes over fifty-two million
acres of designated national parks101 managed under the National Park
Service Organic Act.102 And approximately eighty-nine million acres of
terrestrial federal wildlife refuges are administered by the FWS
pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act
(“NWRSIA”).103 In addition, 111 million acres of the above-listed federal
lands are specially designated by Congress to be federal wilderness104
and subject to an additional overlay of regulation pursuant to the
Wilderness Act of 1964.105
To varying degrees, public land laws each anticipate promoting
biodiversity, but only indirectly or secondarily through other
conservation objectives. National parks, for instance, primarily
emphasize historical preservation—preserving or even restoring
preexisting species or assemblages where they were or are, typically
tethered to a baseline of pre-European settlement.106 This objective has
surely helped preserve substantial biodiversity as compared to
analogous lands subject to human disturbance such as urban,
suburban, or agricultural development. Yet minimizing or reversing
biodiversity loss is not the primary focus; rather, it is on preserving
99. National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687. The Forest Service’s Organic
Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475, created the USFS, and the Multiple-Use SustainedYield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531, broadened the use objectives of the national forests to
include “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” Id. § 528.
100. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785.
101. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 772
(2012),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/2012statab.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PKR-7YEB].
102. National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014).
103. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd, 668ee.
104. See The Beginnings of the National Wilderness Preservation System, WILDERNESS
CONNECT, https://wilderness.net/learn-about-wilderness/fast-facts/default.php (last updated Dec.
8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7V8K-4XLL] (describing the growth of the National Wilderness
Preservation System (“NWPS”) since its beginning in 1964).
105. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1336.
106. Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource
Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REGUL. 171, 218 (2010).
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preexisting conditions. In other words, maintaining historical fidelity
may not necessarily promote biodiversity.
A complement or corollary to historical preservation is ecological
restoration—or assisted recovery—of an ecosystem previously
damaged, degraded, or destroyed by human action.107 It draws
extensively on scientific tools provided by the ecological science
subdiscipline of restoration ecology.108 This approach customarily seeks
to restore disturbed ecosystems to some past baseline,109 though the
particular target baseline may be contentious and value-laden,110 and
some formulations seek to capaciously conceptualize restoration to
advance other conservation values such as ecological integrity.111 The
ongoing Florida Everglades restoration, sanctioned by Congress in
1996,112 is a prominent application and includes goals such as
restoration of historic hydrology, improvement of local water quality,
protection of existing natural habitats, and prevention, eradication,
containment, and management of incursions of invasive species.113 As
with historical preservation, the focus in the Everglades project is on
restoration as a surrogate for reversing biodiversity loss, but the stated

107. See, e.g., What is Ecological Restoration?, SOC’Y FOR ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION, https://
www.ser-rrc.org/what-is-ecological-restoration/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
6MGJ-K7CV] (“Ecological restoration seeks to initiate or accelerate ecosystem recovery following
damage, degradation, or destruction.”).
108. See generally Eric Higgs, The Two-Culture Problem: Ecological Restoration and the
Integration of Knowledge, 13 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 159 (2005) (recommending a broader
approach to restoration and recognizing that the practice of restoration has begun to narrowly
focus on the science of restoration ecology).
109. See, e.g., Richard J. Hobbs, Restoration Ecology: The Challenge of Social Values and
Expectations, 2 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 43, 43 (2004) (“[T]he objective of restoration is often
to return the system to some previous state, often one that existed prior to human influence, such
as pre-Columbian North America.”).
110. Baseline is inevitably a value choice and may be contentious. See id. at 43 (discussing
how choice plays a contentious role in restoration and the values that are considered when
determining restoration goals); Robert T. Lackey, Societal Values and the Proper Role of
Restoration Ecologists, 2 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 45, 45 (2004) (describing how society’s goals
and values are often fragmented, and in turn, “technocrats have an understandable impulse to
insert what they think is, or should be, the appropriate goal”).
111. See Young D. Choi, Restoration Ecology to the Future: A Call for New Paradigm, 15
RESTORATION ECOLOGY 351, 351 (2007) (recommending that restoration no longer focus on
returning ecosystems to a certain point in the past and instead focus on the future).
112. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Everglades Restoration Initiatives,
EVERGLADESRESTORATION.GOV, https://www.evergladesrestoration.gov/oeri/ (last visited Sept. 26,
2020) [https://perma.cc/4B3F-TD64].
113. See Everglades Restoration Goals, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://nps.maps.arcgis.com/apps/
MapSeries/index.html?appid=e5fd5d9df4944b5ab10a727227aef5fe (last visited Aug. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/4DKT-S3ZX] (providing details on eight “subgoals” for Everglades restoration).
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goal is historical fidelity, rather than biodiversity directly.114 Similarly,
areas designated as federal wilderness emphasize wildness or “natural”
preservation, or the minimization of direct human intervention.115
Though this goal may historically have helped reduce direct human
interferences that could result in biodiversity loss, it too is an imperfect
surrogate for biodiversity—particularly for causes of biodiversity loss
that are much more indirect.116
Other lands managed by the USFS and BLM focus on
maintaining multiple uses.117 More recent adjustments of multiple-use
objectives for these lands do emphasize sustainability, which is
described as maintenance of ecological function or integrity under at
least some interpretations.118 But promoting any conception of longterm biodiversity conservation has historically been far from the first
priority of either agency.119 These lands have primarily been driven by

114. See id. Specifically, some goals driven by historical fidelity include restoring nine
thousand square miles of lost habitat and returning the region to its original hydrology and
waterflow. See id.
115. Camacho, supra note 87, at 882.
116. See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 792 (“This focus on promoting historical
fidelity provides limited substantive legal adaptive capacity for NPS managers to engage in
proactive adaptation measures. The tension between fostering active climate change adaptation
strategies that seek to advance future ecological health and the NPS's fundamentally historical
preservation goals is obvious.”).
117. Both the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1), and the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7), require that their respective lands be
managed for multiple uses.
118. See Lia Helena Monteiro de Lima Demange, The Principle of Resilience, 30 PACE ENV’T
L. REV. 695, 808 (2013) (defining ecological resilience as the human’s duty to not impair ecological
maintenance by overusing or depleting resources); Aphrodite Smagadi, Analysis of the Objectives
of the Convention on Biological Diversity: Their Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for
Access and Benefit Sharing, 31 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 243, 263 (2006) (discussing the socioeconomic
paradigm related to development, sustainability, and ethics, and how the maintenance of
ecological integrity falls within this paradigm); Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sustainable
Development: Integrating Economics, Ecology, and Law, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 261, 280 (1995)
(listing the goals of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources’
1996 Conference on Conservation and Development).
119. Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush
Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 282 (2005) (describing the USFS and the BLM as agencies
“whose history and culture puts furthering the interests of extractive industries and local
communities first”).
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consumptive uses, such as timber harvesting,120 grazing,121 and mineral
development,122 and not long-term ecological health.
The National Wildlife Refuge System (“National Refuges”) is in
some sense a hybrid of preservation and sustainable-use goals. The
NWRSIA123 alone does not necessarily restrict management of National
Refuges to preserving historical ecological conditions, directing the
FWS to “ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health of the System are maintained.”124 As such, it
offers the FWS “some ability to manage wildlife refuges in ways that
allow modification of ecological constituents over time.”125 The FWS’s
implementing regulations and policies,126 however, strongly stress
“maintaining current environmental conditions or restoring species and
habitats to some desired former condition.”127 As such, the FWS allows

120. See, e.g., Steven A. Daugherty, The Unfulfilled Promise of an End to Timber Dominance
on the Tongass: Forest Service Implementation of the Tongass Timber Reform Act, 24 ENV’T L. 1573,
1585 n.67 (1994) (“[T]he Forest Service, after years of regulating and cooperating with the timber
industry in Alaska, will attempt to protect the interests of the timber industry in any situation in
which it perceives ambiguity as to the requirements imposed upon it.”); see also Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 748 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the Forest Service “has
been notorious for its alignment with lumber companies, although its mandate from Congress
directs it to consider the various aspects of multiple use in its supervision of the national forests”).
121. See, e.g., Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and
Government, 35 ENV’T L. 721, 727–29 (2005) (exploring reasons for ranchers’ domination of BLM
resource management policies).
122. See Kelly Nolen, Residents at Risk: Wildlife and the Bureau of Land Management's
Planning Process, 26 ENV’T L. 771, 776 (1996) (describing why the BLM has given greater weight
to the interests of the grazing and mining industries); Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Monitoring Governmental Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market
Controls, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1719–20 (1999) (discussing government’s tendency to give away
mineral rights and collect royalties on mining that effectively raise government revenues).
123. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-6668ee.
124. Id. § 668dd(a)(4)(B).
125. Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 776–77.
126. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 601 FW 3, BIOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, DIVERSITY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH (2006), https://www.fws.gov/policy/601fw3.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNF6JECF] (defining “biological integrity” as “[b]iotic composition, structure, and functioning at
genetic, organism, and community levels comparable with historic conditions, including the
natural biological processes that shape genomes, organisms, and communities”); id. (defining
“historic conditions” as “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems resulting from
natural processes that we believe, based on sound professional judgment, were present prior to
substantial human related changes to the landscape”).
127. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-253, CLIMATE CHANGE: VARIOUS ADAPTATION
EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY AT KEY NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AGENCIES 19 (2013),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654991.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG69-ZF8Q]; see also J.B. Ruhl &
James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the
Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18 (2011) (“[T]he FWS strives to manage the nation’s
wildlife refuges toward a baseline of ‘historic conditions.’ ”).
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the introduction of non-native species, but only rarely.128 Again,
this limitation is consistent primarily with an interest in
promoting historical preservation, rather than maximizing
prospective biodiversity.
C. Invasive Species and Other Wildlife Management Laws
To varying extents, other wildlife management laws at least
indirectly target reducing biodiversity loss from human activity. In
particular, a broad range of international, federal, and state invasive
species laws seek to reduce the movement of species outside their native
range. They typically prohibit, restrict, and/or manage the movement
of plants and animals into, out of, or within a jurisdiction. These laws
often institute a permitting process for the importation129 and/or
release130 of certain species, with some regimes developing lists of
prohibited species131 while others elect to generate lists of species not
requiring permits.132 These laws in part have focused on preventing or
mitigating the introduction and/or dispersal of certain (typically nonnative) species that outcompete native species.133
Of course, many of these laws have not been particularly
successful at stemming biodiversity loss from the proliferation of
invasive species.134 Undoubtedly, underenforcement is a key part of this

128. See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 779–80 (“FWS regulations implementing
the ESA make clear that nonnative introduction is supposed to be very rare . . . .”).
129. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.921 (2020) (prohibiting the import of venomous reptiles
and insects without a permit); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (2020) (prohibiting the import of live
wildlife without authorization); IOWA CODE ANN. § 481A.47 (West 2020) (prohibiting the import of
fish and game without a permit).
130. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (prohibiting the release of live wildlife without
authorization); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 3515 (West 2020) (requiring approval to release
nonresident game birds); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-292 (2020) (prohibiting the release of exotic species
of wild animals).
131. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 220-2-.26 (2020) (providing list of prohibited species); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-4, 27-5-5 (2020) (providing list of species for which a license or permit is
required); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4219(a) (2020) (providing that “[t]he commission shall determine
which species of fish are allowed to be propagated in each watershed”).
132. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, §§ 870.10(a)-870.10(b) (2020) (establishing the
“Acquatic Life Approved Species List,” which “is comprised of specific species of aquatic life, within
the categories of fish, crustaceans, gastropods, mollusks and plants”).
133. See, e.g., National Invasive Species Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C. § 4701 (declaring the
legislative purpose of preventing “unintentional introduction and dispersal of nonindigenous
species into the waters of the United States”).
134. See Clinton N. Jenkins, Kyle S. Van Houtan, Stuart L. Pimm & Joseph O. Sexton, US
Protected Lands Mismatch Biodiversity Priorities, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 5081 (2015)
(asserting that the United States largely fails to protect biodiversity).
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lack of success.135 Nonetheless, a core problem with many of these laws
is that they are not focused on promoting long-term ecological health.
Like some public land laws, many of these laws are almost
reflexively directed at historical preservation—resisting the movement
of any species not native to an area, without considering whether that
movement aids or detracts from ecological health.136 Relatedly, some
provisions maintain that a native species cannot be invasive (and thus
restricted), even if the species reduces biodiversity.137
Other invasive species provisions are focused more on natural
preservation—preventing direct human introductions of species.138
Intentional movement, whether or not beneficial for ecological health,
is treated with skepticism, if not hostility.139 In contrast, under some
such provisions, “natural” migration of a species is deemed acceptable,
whether or not such movement reduces ecological health.140
Contrast these laws with the lack of conservation restrictions on
the introduction or movement of certain species that are very common,
often non-native, and that, by most accounts, have had significant
effects on biodiversity. Broad swaths of human-disturbed lands
integrate livestock and monoculture crops141 (including cattle and
wheat that are non-native to the United States142) that have
significantly narrowed the nation’s biomass into a few categories. This
reduction in diversity has largely remained untouched by invasive
135. See Camacho et al., supra note 93 (analyzing state endangered species laws and
concluding that most state regimes are inadequate).
136. See Camacho, supra note 87, at 870–71 (arguing that U.S. species re-introduction laws
largely focus on rigid classifications rather than ecological health).
137. See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,751, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,609, 88,610 (Dec. 8, 2016) (requiring a
species to be non-native to qualify as an “invasive species” ).
138. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 220-2-.26 (focusing on prohibiting human introductions of
listed species); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, §§ 870.10(a)-870.10(b) (proscribing human importation or
possession of non-approved species); Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (making it unlawful to
trade illegally acquired fish or wildlife); Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7702, 7711-7721,
7731-7736, 7751-7761, 7771-7772, 7781-7786 (providing for the promulgation of regulations aimed
at preventing the “spread of plant pests or noxious weeds”).
139. See Camacho, supra note 106, at 176 (describing opposition to intentional movement as
a strategy for responding to climate change).
140. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES § 4.4.4.1 (2006), https://www.nps.
gov/policy/MP_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HSD-RL7P].
141. See Census of Agriculture Highlights: Farms and Farmland, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Aug.
2019), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_Farms_Farmland.p
df [https://perma.cc/4SJ2-NVEA] (noting that as of 2017, the United States had more than nine
hundred million acres of farmland across approximately two million farms).
142. See François Balfourier, Sophie Bouchet, Sandra Robert, Romain De Oliveira, Hélène
Rimbert, Jonathan Kitt, Frédéric Choulet, International Wheat Genome Sequencing Consortium,
BreedWheat Consortium & Etienne Pau, Worldwide Phylogeography and History of Wheat Genetic
Diversity, SCI. ADVANCES, May 2019, at 1, 1 (describing the arrival of wheat in North America);
G.A. Bowling, The Introduction of Cattle into Colonial North America, 25 J. DAIRY SCI. 129 (1942).
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species laws, and in fact has received (and continues to receive)
significant public subsidy.143
D. Corridors and Private Incentives
The dominant strategies for preventing further biodiversity loss
have been reserving certain lands, limiting development that further
harms endangered species, and curbing the introduction and movement
of invasive species. There have, however, been a number of other
attempts to build conservation strategies. These often have been more
focused on reducing some of the indirect stressors that lead to
biodiversity loss.
Particularly notable have been the proliferating efforts to
promote more comprehensive assessments of ecological conservation,
such as ecosystem-based and landscape-level planning.144 Rather than
focusing on a particular species, these approaches seek to manage
ecological phenomena as a network, either at the ecosystem or broader
landscape scale.145 The ESA in fact has been supplemented and
143. See Dan Charles, Farmers Got Billions from Taxpayers in 2019, and Hardly Anyone
Objected, NPR: THE SALT (Dec. 31, 2019, 4:13 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thesalt/2019/12/31/790261705/farmers-got-billions-from-taxpayers-in-2019-and-hardlyanyone-objected [https://perma.cc/YL38-YTKB] (detailing significant farm subsidies in the Unites
States). At more provincial and international scales, governments have relied on other wildlife
management laws that primarily seek to maintain the productivity of particular desired (usually
game) species. See, e.g., Julie Lurman Joly, National Wildlife Refuges and Intensive Management
in Alaska: Another Case for Preemption, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 27, 29 (2010):
Alaska's fish and wildlife management program, like most state wildlife programs, is
geared toward providing hunting opportunities . . . . The intention of the program is to
maintain a “sustained yield,” which the statute defines as “the achievement and
maintenance in perpetuity of the ability to support a high level of human harvest of game,
subject to preferences among beneficial uses, on an annual or periodic basis.”;
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45615, INTERNATIONAL TROPHY HUNTING 10–11 (2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45615 [https://perma.cc/48Q3-4HTJ] (examining
various international, regional, and national wildlife laws, including those that encourage game
hunting as part of a species protection program). Though these laws may have helped sustain
ecological resources, they are not part of a coherent plan for promoting long-term ecological
conservation and may actually be deemed to harm biodiversity. See, e.g., Palila v. Haw. Dep't of
Land & Nat. Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (D. Haw. 1986) (concluding that the Hawaii wildlife
agency’s sport-hunting program had harmed vital endangered species habitat biodiversity and
violated the ESA).
144. See John Kostyack, Joshua J. Lawler, Dale D. Goble, Julian D. Olden & J. Michael Scott,
Beyond Reserves and Corridors: Policy Solutions to Facilitate the Movement of Plants and Animals
in a Changing Climate, 61 BIOSCIENCE 713 (2011) (introducing policy options to prevent climateinduced extinctions).
145. See, e.g., Norman L. Christensen, Ann M. Bartuska, James H. Brown, Stephen
Carpenter, Carla D'Antonio, Rober Francis, Jerry F. Franklin, James A. MacMahon, Reed F. Noss,
David J. Parsons, Charles H. Peterson, Monica G. Turner & Robert G. Woodmansee, The Report
of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management,
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reworked to integrate consideration of ecosystem-based and landscapelevel management through initiatives such as the HCP program and
recovery planning.146
Relatedly, some management strategies have sought to foster
ecological connectivity between governing jurisdictions as well as lands.
This has included the creation and expansion of passive management
techniques like wildlife corridors to potentially facilitate dispersal
between protected areas.147 Intergovernmental planning and
coordination have also played a role.148 Yet even these alternatives,
when implemented, have mostly been fairly passive management
strategies. In other words, they establish areas that merely allow the
opportunity for migrations, alleviating but not eliminating
dispersal barriers that fragment landscapes and thus further
impair biodiversity.149
Other strategies recognize that regulation of future development
alone does not slow down biodiversity loss, let alone improve ecological
health. As such, the need to offer incentives for private and other nonreserve landowners to promote biodiversity has become increasingly
clear.150 Under the ESA, for example, candidate conservation
agreements, the No Surprises policy, and the Safe Harbors policy seek
to provide incentives for private protection or reserves beyond
regulatory prohibitions.151 These various strategies, including funding
6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 (1996) (describing ecosystem-based management); Jeffrey Sayer,
Terry Sunderland, Jaboury Ghazoul, Jean-Laurent Pfund, Douglas Sheil, Erik Meijaard, Michelle
Venter, Agni Klintuni Boedhihartono, Michael Day, Claude Garcia, Cora van Oosten & Louise E.
Buck, Ten Principles for a Landscape Approach to Reconciling Agriculture, Conservation, and
Other Competing Land Uses, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8349 (2013) (explaining
landscape-level planning).
146. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982).
147. See Kostyack et al., supra note 144, at 713–14 (discussing corridors as a potential, but
ultimately insufficient, strategy to facilitate dispersal); Mark R. Christie & L. Lacey Knowles,
Habitat Corridors Facilitate Genetic Resilience Irrespective of Species Dispersal Abilities or
Population Sizes, 8 EVOLUTIONARY APPLICATIONS 454, 460–61 (2015) (observing that habitat
corridors not only increase ecological health but also genetic resilience).
148. E.g., DANIEL POLLAK, CAL. RSCH. BUREAU, THE FUTURE OF HABITAT CONSERVATION? THE
NCCP EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 7 (2001) (depicting the program as “in many ways a
joint state-federal initiative”).
149. See, e.g., Wildlife Corridors, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/refuges/
features/wildlife-corridors.html (last updated Oct. 31, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L2P6-TX6D].
150. See FRANK CASEY, SARA VICKERMAN, CHERYL HUMMON & BRUCE TAYLOR, DEFS. OF
WILDLIFE, INCENTIVES FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION: AN ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT 7–8 (2006) (explaining incentive programs).
151. Candidate conservation agreements are voluntary compacts between the FWS and
landowners to conserve species that are candidates for listing but not yet listed under the ESA.
See Candidate Conservation Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Oct. 2017),
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/CCAs.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9K8-2NGD]. Safe
harbor agreements are voluntary agreements in which a landowner agrees to contribute to a listed
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of private conservation, attempt to encourage landowners to employ
more active conservation measures, such as restoration, rather than
just avoid development.152 As such, these potential strategies begin to
acknowledge the influence of decisions that occur on human-dominated
landscapes on biodiversity loss generally, and on reserved lands in
particular, and seek to alter such activities.
E. Substantive Limitations of Public Biodiversity Governance
Though these prevailing strategies have always been at best
imperfect promoters of biodiversity, they become especially inadequate
in the context of global anthropogenic climate change. Each may have
advanced a different, limited goal of biodiversity loss prevention:
prevent species from going extinct, limit direct human destruction of
habitat, restrict the introduction of invasive species, or set aside some
areas for their natural resources.
Yet none are surrogates for more comprehensive forms of
biodiversity, such as ecological health. Many commenters have
recognized that preventing further human development does not
reverse and often may not even address biodiversity loss.153 Focusing
on individual species that are most in danger of extinction may be
necessary, but hardly sufficient, for stemming broader notions of
biodiversity loss.154 Restricting the movement of invasive species may
be useful but also difficult, if not counterproductive, if it retards

species’ recovery and the FWS provides the landowner (1) assurance of no further requirements
and (2) the right to return the land to its baseline condition when the agreement ends. For
Landowners: Safe Harbor Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/safe-harbor-agreements.html
[https://perma.cc/
6JHA-HVP7]. The “no surprises” policy assures any landowner that, if that landowner agrees to
an HCP, no additional obligations will be imposed should unforeseen circumstances arise. Habitat
Conservation Plans: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (July 15,
2013), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/hcp-faq.html [https://perma.cc/L9FZ-LNCN]
(clarifying the “no surprises” policy within the HCPs).
152. See sources cited supra note 151.
153. See, e.g., LAURA C. HOOD, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1 (1998); Michael J. Bean & David S. Wilcove, Editorial, The PrivateLand Problem, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1, 1 (1997) (describing absolute prohibition of habitat
destruction as unsuccessful in protecting species on private land); Camacho, supra note 85, at 301
(arguing that “merely preventing human development did little” to address biodiversity concerns);
U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., USAID BIODIVERSITY POLICY 7–8 (2014) (detailing the drivers of
biodiversity loss not addressed by merely limiting future development).
154. See Carol A. Bloomgarden, Protecting Endangered Species Under Future Climate
Change: From Single-Species Preservation to an Anticipatory Policy Approach, 19 ENV’T MGMT.
641, 645 (1995) (asserting that policymakers should emphasize “proactive, dynamic protection”
over individual species preservation).
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valuable species movement.155 And biodiversity values are obviously not
housed solely on protected areas. But these simple biodiversity
management strategies are likely to be increasingly ineffective at
averting more indirect biodiversity loss from large-scale shifts of
conditions due to global anthropogenic climate change.
For endangered species preservation, permit-by-permit
regulatory hooks are not likely to even achieve the limited goal of
preventing extinction of listed species when the core stressor is a change
in climatic conditions that make the species less compatible with its
existing habitat.156 Even the best large multispecies plans that rely on
more comprehensive multispecies or ecosystem-based management
focus on preserving or restoring preexisting assemblages of species.157
Such plans are not set up to address when one such species is no longer
compatible with the conditions wrought by climate change and needs to
migrate elsewhere to thrive. Or when other species need to migrate into
the plan area to survive.
Reserved lands strategies focused on promoting historical
preservation, restoration, or natural preservation may actually run
counter to long-term ecological health. Myriad studies conclude that the
rate and amount of strain on ecological resources from climate change
is outside the range of historical variability, leading to fundamental
ecological shifts and transformations.158 Nonintervention under such
circumstances would allow change, but would also be at odds with
promoting biodiversity in a number of contexts. Valued species will be
unable to migrate without human assistance due to topographical and
human-created physical and regulatory dispersal barriers,159 while

155. See Camacho, supra note 106, at 255 (arguing that movement of non-native species could
be valuable).
156. See Bloomgarden, supra note 154, at 643–45 (1995) (declaring “the Endangered Species
Act’s single-species, emergency-room approach” as likely a failure).
157. See, e.g., LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, https://
www.lcrmscp.gov/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y6ZS-4SHW].
158. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 62–70 (Christopher B. Field, Vicente R. Barros, David
Jon Dokken, Katharine J. Mach, Michael D. Mastrandrea, T. Eren Bilir, Monalisa Chatterjee,
Kristie L. Ebi, Yuka Otsuki Estrada, Robert C. Genova, Betelhem Girma, Eric S. Kissel, Andrew
N. Levy, Sandy MacCracken, Patricia R. Mastrandrea & Leslie L. White eds., 2014) (providing
technical evidence demonstrating the impacts of climate change); U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH.
PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME II: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND
ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (2018) (illustrating various climate change indicators).
159. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 158, at 324
(describing contemporary barriers to migration); see also Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the
Means and Ends of Natural Resource Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1441 (2011) (describing
topographical, physical, and regulatory barriers that are “likely to lead to increased conflict
between inconsistent management objectives”).
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new harmful species may be able to shift and reduce overall
ecological health.
Climate change heightens the potential conflict between
noninterventionist and historical preservation objectives. With the
large-scale shifts in climatic conditions, public land managers will
increasingly be unable to simultaneously maintain or restore historical
conditions and refrain from active management.160
Climate change also accentuates the tension between the ESA’s
species-focused conservation and public land management that
concentrates on maintaining or restoring place-based historical fidelity.
Of course, such tension already exists. For example, invasive species
eradication as part of native ecosystem restoration may contravene the
ESA if it were to adversely modify an endangered species’ critical
habitat (e.g., when the invasive species provides food or shelter for an
endangered species).161 But climate change is likely to make such
conflicts much more common—for instance, if preserving a species in
the face of global changes necessitates movement to new locations that
is antithetical to restoration or preservation objectives.
Regrettably, historical preservation and restoration are poorly
positioned to counter biodiversity loss in a changing climate.162
Conventional historical preservation and restoration strategies would
seek to resist immigration of new species that need to shift to adapt to
climate change, or they may require active promotion of preexisting
species that are increasingly incompatible with changing climatic
conditions.163 As I have stated elsewhere, “Climate change ensures that
in many cases there will be escalating ecological and other costs, and
diminishing gains from engaging in ecosystem preservation and
restoration.”164 Similarly, invasive species laws that prevent species
movement to maintain native historical conditions may promote

160. See Camacho, supra note 159, at 1432–33 (arguing that active management has become
virtually necessary to protect ecological systems).
161. See, e.g., Michael L. Casazza, Cory T. Overton, Thuy-Vy D. Bui, Joshua M. Hull, Joy D.
Albertson, Valary K. Bloom, Steven Bobzien, Jennifer McBroom, Marilyn Latta, Peggy Olofson,
Tobias M. Rohmer, Steven Schwarzbach, Donald R. Strong, Erik Grijalva, Julian K. Wood,
Shannon M. Skalos & John Takekawa, Endangered Species Management and Ecosystem
Restoration: Finding the Common Ground, 21 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 19 (2016) (showing population
increase of bird species due to habitat created by invasive plant species).
162. See Camacho, supra note 159, at 1432 (“If maintaining the human-nature
dichotomy . . . was ever an attainable goal, it certainly is not now.”).
163. Id. at 1438–39 (arguing that conventional tactics will not withstand climate change).
164. Id. at 1435.
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biodiversity in some cases but hinder it in others, such as when a nonnative key “valuable” species needs to move to adapt.165
National Forests and BLM lands, which are more fundamentally
premised on maximizing productivity or sustained yield, in theory
might actually be the most adaptable to climate change and
biodiversity. This is because they allow for the possibility of
adaptability to promote long-term ecological function or integrity.166 Yet
the historical emphasis on consumptive uses and significant discretion
provided to the BLM and USFS to implement their management
mandates has ensured that these lands remain largely focused on
maximizing the yield of certain desired species (such as timber or
extractive uses) than on reducing biodiversity loss.167
Finally, corridors and other strategies for improving
connectivity may increase the opportunity for some species to
migrate.168 But, unfortunately, they will not be feasible or helpful in a
variety of circumstances, including for species with slow dispersal rates,
in isolated areas, or to overcome large-scale dispersal barriers.169
Moreover, such passive strategies still raise significant, value-laden
questions regarding which species to facilitate and which to impede.
Thus, many of the fundamental goals of existing natural resource
governance, and the range of strategies used for achieving such
objectives, are at best weakly tethered to reducing biodiversity loss.
III. THE PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS OF
PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE
As compared to substantive and structural governance, a
comparatively substantial amount of attention has been paid in the
planning, law, and management literatures most relevant to
biodiversity loss to assessing public governance procedures and
suggesting ways to better manage uncertainty and complexity. As
explained earlier, wicked problems scholars have offered various
methods for moderating wicked problems.170 Typically proposed by
165. See Camacho, supra note 87, at 873–74 (describing the illogical duality between native
and non-native preferences).
166. See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 745 (arguing that discretion increases
legal adaptive capacity, thereby positioning land well to adapt to climate change).
167. See id. at 744.
168. See, e.g., Christie & Knowles, supra note 147, at 455, 460–61; Lars A. Brudvig, Ellen I.
Damschen, Joshua J. Tewksbury, Nick M. Haddad & Douglas J. Levey, Landscape Connectivity
Promotes Plant Biodiversity Spillover into Non-Target Habitats, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 9328,
9330–31 (2009).
169. Kostyack et al., supra note 144, at 713–14, 716.
170. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
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planning scholars, these methods predictably focus on a range of
planning frameworks, steps, and techniques for incorporating diverse
perspectives in order to foster iterative problem-solving.171
In the environmental management and law context, which is
especially pertinent to biodiversity loss, an established literature on
adaptive management has similarly developed on the limitations of
governmental processes for coping with uncertainty and change.172
Unfortunately, public biodiversity governance’s procedural legal
adaptive capacity remains limited. The standard public processes used
for implementing public biodiversity management and for regulating
private activity have not been well structured to promote learning and
manage the substantial uncertainties and evolving character of
ecological resources. More recent attempts to integrate adaptive
management—coping
with
uncertainty
through
provisional
decisionmaking, monitoring, and adjustment—remain limited but hold
significant promise for better managing the complexities of biodiversity
loss and changing ecological conditions.
A. Inflexible Conventional Public Processes
Conventional administrative law is far from adaptive. As
uncertainty is often understood to be a characteristic trait of
environmental risk,173 even more routine natural resources decisions
are regularly made in a context of limited information.174 Conventional
administrative procedures regularly used in natural resources law,
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or permitting as codified in the

171. See, e.g., Kunz & Rittel, supra note 58, at 2 (discussing how the process of discourse and
information exchange supports problem solving); Jeff Conklin, Dialogue Mapping: Breaking
the Chains of Linear Process, COGNEXUS INST. 3, 11 (2007)
http://www.cognexus.org/
webinars/Webinar-new.pdf [https://perma.cc/76XJ-K59K] (detailing dialogue mapping as an
approach to solving wicked problems); Rosenhead, supra note 60, at 119–20 (proposing a
participative and interactive method for complex problem solving); Ritchey, supra note 61, at 5–6
(discussing General Morphological Analysis); Jesus Navarro, Peter Hayward & Joseph Voros, How
to Solve a Wicked Problem? Furniture Foresight Case Study, 10 FORESIGHT 11, 11–12 (2008)
(suggesting a “morphological foresight” approach to resolving wicked problems); HORN & WEBER,
supra note 63, at 5 (proposing mess mapping and resolution mapping for resolving
wicked problems).
172. See infra notes 173–182 and accompanying text. As these critiques are prevalent and
well known in the literature, this Part only briefly summarizes them in the context of public
biodiversity governance.
173. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 494, 498–99 (2008); Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208–09 (1978).
174. Camacho, supra note 159, at 1414.
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Administrative Procedure Act,175 are not well designed for managing
uncertainty or reducing mistakes.176 This is primarily because they rely
on a static comprehensive rationality or front-end model of government
decisionmaking,177 which assumes agencies can and should focus most
of their attention and resources on initial decisions that are at best
occasionally revisited to account for new information or changes in
circumstances.178 Permitting also leans heavily on applicants, whose
incentives often do not align with biodiversity conservation, for
information generation and analysis.179
This front-end approach is especially problematic for
implementing “ecological resilience strategies when variability is on the
rise and prediction is unreliable.”180 In addition, though ambient and
post-decision monitoring are often required, they often are poorly
resourced or otherwise deficient.181 Even rarer is the adjustment of
initial decisions to account for new information.182
B. Limited Attempts to Promote Procedural Adaptive Capacity
As a result of these shortcomings, many scholars have called for
the integration of “adaptive management”183—systematic monitoring,
175. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559; id. §§ 551(5), 551(7) (defining rulemaking and adjudication); id.
§§ 701-706 (providing for judicial review of agency action).
176. See, e.g., Craig R. Allen, Joseph J. Fontaine, Kevin L. Pope & Ahjond S. Garmestani,
Adaptive Management for a Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENV’T MGMT. 1339, 1343 (2011).
177. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 4.
178. Camacho, supra note 159, at 1414; Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 4–5.
179. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 324–26 (“Because the HCP program relies so heavily on
the permittees . . . , monitoring under the HCP program requires a high level of faith that
permittees have both the incentive and the ability to assess conformity with public goals.”).
180. Ruhl, supra note 20, at 1393.
181. See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,
34–52 (2011) (highlighting internal and external obstacles and disincentives agencies face in
development and implementation of monitoring programs); MGMT. SYS. INT’L, AN INDEPENDENT
EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM 20 (2008), https://www.fws.gov/refuges/pdfs/NWRS_Evaluation_
FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVV3-LHBW] (“[O]nly 11% of refuge managers surveyed
described the current level of inventory and monitoring work as being mostly or fully sufficient.”);
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 28–29
(1997) (discussing how flexible government regimes will “produce better rules that are more likely
to accomplish legislative goals” and that rules should be “revised in light of experience”).
182. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 37–38, 64 (2009) (“Because such
experiments fail to provide incentives for regulators and managers to work with and learn from
their counterparts, existing collaborative efforts have added yet another layer of fragmentation to
the already disjointed regulatory landscape.”); Freeman, supra note 181, at 16–17.
183. E.g., INT’L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT 1 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Donald Ludwig,
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assessment, and adjustment of resource management decisions—and
similar strategies that promote provisionalism and experimentalism184
to manage uncertainty in natural resources decisionmaking. A growing
number of government authorities claim to adopt and rely on adaptive
management strategies in managing or regulating the use of natural
resources.185 Some have suggested it is vital in the context of addressing
biodiversity loss, particularly for adapting to the effects of global
climate change on ecological resources.186 Though formal adaptive
management may not be appropriate in all contexts,187 broad-scale
integration of even less rigorously adaptive strategies, such as
contingency188 or scenario planning,189 would nonetheless still promote
legal adaptive capacity.190
Systematic employment of any of these more adaptive processes,
however, remains atypical. In the context of biodiversity conservation,
there have been numerous useful attempts to engage in more adaptive,
coordinated processes. The most thorough effort to do so under the ESA

In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN
HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 21–22 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002); GEORGE
H. STANKEY, ROGER N. CLARK & BERNARD T. BORMANN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 31–
33 (2005), www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr654.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH4N-M9RM].
184. Freeman, supra note 181, at 28–29; Michael C. Dorf & Charles E. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 328–89 (1998).
185. Camacho, supra note 159, at 1415.
186. See, e.g., Hillary M. Hoffmann, Climate Change and the Decline of the Federal Range: Is
Adaptive Management the Solution?, 15 VT. J. ENV’T L. 262, 263 (2014); Joseph Arvai, Gavin
Bridge, Nives Dolsak, Robert Franzese, Tomas Koontz, April Luginbuhl, Paul Robbins, Kenneth
Richards, Katrina Smith Korfmacher, Brent Sohngen, James Tansey & Alexander Thompson,
Adaptive Management of the Global Climate Problem: Bridging the Gap Between Climate Research
and Climate Policy, 78 CLIMATIC CHANGE 217, 219 (2006); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RISING TO
THE URGENT CHALLENGE: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESPONDING TO ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE
15–17 (2010), http://www.fws.gov/home/climatechange/pdf/CCStrategicPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D48B-GSDW].
187. See, e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS, WILLIAM L. ANDREEN, ALEJANDRO CAMACHO, DANIEL A.
FARBER, ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DALE GOBLE, BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, DANIEL ROHLF, A. DAN
TARLOCK, SANDRA B. ZELLMER, SHANA JONES & YEE HUANG, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
MAKING GOOD USE OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 5–9 (2011), https://cpr-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/
documents/Adaptive_Management_1104.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYJ5-5E9H] (noting that while
“adaptive management is an important tool” in addressing environmental issues, when not used
properly, “it can provide an excuse to delay politically uncomfortable decisions and to inhibit
effective public oversight”); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 18–27.
188. Gregg P. Macey, The Architecture of Ignorance, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1627, 1667 (2013)
(discussing use of contingency planning to accommodate data gaps in environmental law).
189. See 2 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
SCENARIOS (Steve R. Carpenter, Prabhu L. Pingali, Elena M. Bennett & Monika B. Zurek eds.,
2005) (providing an analytical framework that offers tools for addressing ecosystem change
through a series of “scenarios”).
190. See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 733.
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was as part of the emphasis on developing more comprehensive,
multispecies, multiagency habitat conservation planning.191 FWS
regulations require contingency planning in HCPs for foreseeable
changed circumstances,192 and the agency has long emphasized the
value of adaptive implementation.193 In particular, they promote but
rarely require use of adaptive management procedures.194 Moreover,
the federal land agencies have adopted, to varying extents, the use of
some form of adaptive management for at least some land management
planning.195 But its use still remains limited in natural resources
conservation,196 with the core procedural infrastructure of natural
resources governance (including judicial review) suspicious of and even
resistant to effective adaptive management.197
It is perhaps unsurprising then that numerous scholars have
documented the limitations of the attempted use of adaptive
management in integrating provisionalism into natural resources
governance. Some have pointed to how adaptive procedures are often
elective198 and that public and private actors typically lack the
resources or other incentives to engage in adaptive decisionmaking.199
Others criticized agency invocation of adaptive management as little

191. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 334; Cameron W. Barrows, Monica B. Swartz, Wendy L.
Hodges, Michael F. Allen, John T. Rotenberry, Bai-Lian Li, Thomas A. Scott & Xiongwen Chen, A
Framework for Monitoring Multiple-Species Conservation Plans, 69 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1333, 1334
(2005); Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, 18 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 4, 4–6 (2001)
(describing HCPs that successfully integrated adaptive management).
192. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5) (2019).
193. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 329 (discussing the agency’s long-claimed “commitment
to HCP adaptation during implementation”).
194. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK 10-27 to 10-33
(2016) (explaining adaptive management and the benefits of incorporating it into an HCP).
195. See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 757–58, 767, 781, 792–93, 803 (detailing
adoption by various federal land agencies of adaptive management protocols for certain
federal lands).
196. See, e.g., Barrows et al., supra note 191, at 1335 (describing the limited use of adaptive
management procedures in HCPs); Camacho, supra note 85, at 335.
197. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 9–10.
198. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 331.
199. See R. Gregory, D. Ohlson & J. Arvai, Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for
Applications to Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2413 (2006)
(noting that a lack of institutional support can make applying adaptive management very
difficult); J. Michael Scott, Brad Griffith, Robert S. Adamcik, Daniel M. Ashe, Brian Czech, Robert
L. Fischman, Patrick Gonzalez, Joshua J. Lawler, A. David McGuire & Anna Pidgorna, National
Wildlife Refuges, in PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE
ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 5-1, 5-35 (Susan Herrod Julius & Jordan M. West eds., 2008)
(discussing the legal, monetary, and administrative barriers that make it difficult to implement
adaptive management strategies); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 12–13.
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more than a catchphrase200 or, worse, as a method for enabling action
while obscuring or deferring consideration of significant environmental
risks.201 Though monitoring is usually required, it nonetheless remains
inadequate even in adaptive management regimes.202 And although
regular adjustment of provisional strategies is supposed to be a core
trait of adaptive management, even well-regarded adaptive
management experiments have not systematically integrated
accumulated information to adjust management actions.203
Yet the problem extends beyond the limitations of on-the-ground
uses of adaptive management and other flexible decisionmaking
protocols. As detailed in the next Part, public biodiversity governance
is largely not well designed to manage procedural uncertainties at a
large scale. This is because it suffers from the absence of an
infrastructure for systematically monitoring, assessing, and
adjusting public processes to promote learning and thus more
adaptive governance.204
IV. THE STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS OF
PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE
Beyond the goals, tools, and processes of public biodiversity
governance, the structure of governmental authority—to whom
authority is allocated, and the relationship between such institutions—
considerably influences how well concerns about biodiversity are
managed. Few wicked problems scholars, however, have focused on
structural considerations, and those who have explored it have largely
combined exploration of structural with procedural design.205 In the
200. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 16.
201. Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 737; see Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 11.
202. See Camacho, supra note 159, at 1416. Moreover, monitoring does not always include the
collection of data about ambient conditions, provisional assumptions, and the effectiveness of
adopted strategies. Id. at 1413–14.
203. See, e.g., DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 187, at 11 (noting that “[o]ne of the most significant
weaknesses” of adaptive management has been a failure of agencies to deliver on their promises
of adaptation); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 424, 427, 461 (2010) (noting that courts “frequently are underwhelmed by how agencies
implement adaptive management” in litigation over its use in resource management); Lawrence
Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho & Todd Schenk, Collaborative Planning and Adaptive
Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1, 35–38 (2010) (detailing
failures by Congress and agencies to adequately collect and incorporate stakeholder feedback in
creating the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program).
204. Camacho, supra note 159, at 1417; Camacho, supra note 182, at 64–76.
205. See, e.g., Nancy Roberts, Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution, 1 INT’L
PUB. MGMT. REV. 1, 2, 8 (2000) (highlighting tactics for distributing power among stakeholders);
Lynelle Briggs, Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective, AUSTL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N,
https://www.apsc.gov.au/tackling-wicked-problems-public-policy-perspective (last updated June
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context of biodiversity loss, for instance, one set of wicked problems
scholars briefly recommend greater development of institutions in
combination with “multidisciplinarity” and “taking personal
responsibility.”206 Helpfully, Professors Ruhl and Salzman do explore
how procedural strategies like predecision assessment, adaptive
management, and cost-benefit analysis can be informed by theories
such as dynamic federalism, new governance, and transgovernmental
networks to help government institutions whittle away at massive
problems.207 In this sense, they do consider how structural
considerations can help manage wicked problems. But even their useful
analysis and proposal for “ ‘weak ties’ networks” does not attempt to
parse the various features and trade-offs of structural design.208
More generally, scholars and policymakers have neglected the
possibility of distinguishing between three distinctive dimensions of
authority—namely, the extent authority is centralized, overlapped, and
coordinated.209 Additionally, insufficient attention has been afforded to
how the configuration of authority along these dimensions can, and
often should be, altered for different governmental functions.210 Parsing
the allocation of authority in each of these ways can clarify the tradeoffs of different allocations, allowing for authority to be tailored in ways
that leverage the advantages and address the shortcomings of public
biodiversity governance.
As explained in this Part, public biodiversity governance is
largely fragmented into many decentralized, at times overlapping, and
relatively independent government institutions. There has been a
proliferation of various formal and informal structures attempting to
manage the relationship of these disparate authorities. Depending on
the metric, some have been successful at helping link government
management strategies over ecological resources. Others have
inadvertently served as yet another layer of concurrent, but
12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/J2AD-L68Z] (summarizing Roberts, supra, and suggesting sharing of
problem-solving responsibility and information across government agencies and with
nongovernmental entities); Michèle Morner & Manuel Misgeld, Governing Wicked Problems: The
Role of Self-organizing Governance in Fostering the Problem-Solving Capabilities of Public Sector
Organizations, ECPR 3–4 (2014), https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/f64cbbb5-3fed-4c509b9b-da8fc498303b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UND-KWHS] (noting the need for collaboration
between public officials and citizens in resolving wicked problems).
206. Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 276–77 (“The recent foundation of the
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) brings
hope, because solutions to wicked problems are not technical or scientific but require institutional,
political and philosophical engagements.”).
207. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 95–108.
208. See id. at 108, 116–19.
209. REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 38–39.
210. Id. at 21–30.
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uncoordinated, authority. More fundamentally, much of public
biodiversity governance still remains fragmented and ill-designed to
manage large-scale shifts in conditions that are increasingly
problematic for biodiversity conservation.
A. A Baseline of Decentralized, Distinct Authority
As alluded to earlier, there are many public institutions involved
in managing or regulating actions affecting biodiversity conservation.
Ecological resources are divided largely based on the type of land on
which they are located, with the bulk of natural resource management
in the United States on federal, state, and local public lands. Even just
a focus on federal land management shows decentralized authority over
different lands by the USFS, BLM, NPS, and FWS, among others.211 In
addition, each state has at least one land agency that manages actions
on its respective state-owned land.212 These lands are typically
organized by type of land being managed or protected, and
administering authorities have authority over the range of government
functions over that particular land.213 Baseline management authority
of ecological resources in this largely place-based patchwork is fairly
decentralized, distinct, and independent, with each state or federal
agency charged with relatively exclusive management of its
jurisdictional lands.214
B. Some Overlap and Limited Coordination
There are a few important regulatory frameworks, however, that
create overlap and some formal coordination of authority. The most
notable are laws protecting or regulating a particular category of
species, including endangered, wildlife, invasive, and agricultural
species. As noted earlier, under the ESA, the FWS and NMFS215
regulate private and public activity that might harm or jeopardize listed
wildlife species.216 Their similarly decentralized authority overlaps with

211. Id. at 33 n.6.
212. See id. at 33.
213. See, e.g., About the California State Lands Commission, CAL. ST. LANDS COMM’N,
https://www.slc.ca.gov/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5LYY-33MC]; Our Agency’s
History, CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, https://resources.ca.gov/About-Us/Our-Agencys-History (last
visited Sept. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9V8P-A828].
214. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 213.
215. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining the administration of the ESA
through the FWS and NMFS).
216. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1), 1538(a)(2)(C).
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those of the federal land agencies, as well as each other.217 Many states
also have promulgated endangered species statutes that follow the
general template of the federal ESA, though there are differences in the
activities prohibited and allowed without a permit.218 This authority,
administered by state wildlife agencies, overlaps with federal wildlife
regulatory authority, as well as state and federal lands management.219
These laws can also result in coordinated authority when an
endangered species exists in resource areas under the jurisdiction of
other agencies. Most notably, section 7 of the federal ESA expressly
requires all federal agencies to coordinate with the NMFS (for marine
species) or the FWS (for freshwater and wildlife species) when
considering actions that might “jeopardize the continued existence” of
listed endangered or threatened species or “result in the destruction or
adverse modification of” their critical habitats.220 This coordination,
which extends to agency planning, information generation,
implementation, and postapproval monitoring,221 is quite in-depth and
hierarchical.222 Action agencies are largely required to adopt Service
recommendations and even abandon the action if the Service
determines it is necessary to avoid jeopardy.223 The ESA also includes a
number of less rigorous coordination mechanisms. For example, it
requires the FWS to communicate with state authorities for
determinations of the critical habitat for listed species.224
A second avenue of interjurisdictional coordination is the
assortment of federal and state laws that regulate invasive species,
which create significant overlap and some interagency coordination.
Various federal statutes regulate interstate invasive species
movement.225 Executive Order 13,751, which restricts federal agency
217. REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 38–39; GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS &
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §§ 17, 29, 32 (2d ed. 2007).
218. See Camacho, supra note 106, at 200 (giving specific examples of differences in
state laws).
219. See, e.g., Camacho et al., supra note 93, at 10838, 10841 (explaining that all states but
one have endangered species laws and nearly one-third have private land use regulation).
220. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
221. See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 113–14 (describing federal
interagency coordination under the ESA).
222. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1146 (2012).
223. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (2019); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
169–70 (1997).
224. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
225. See, e.g., Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42 (banning shipment of injurious species); Plant
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7786 (targeting the shipment of plant pests); Animal Health
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8322 (authorizing the secretary of the treasury to ban any import
containing any pest or disease of livestock).
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introductions of invasive species,226 establishes a National Invasive
Species Council composed of thirteen federal agencies to help coordinate
federal invasive species management.227 Some state invasive species
laws require private and public parties to get permits for the
importation and perhaps even in-state release228 of categories of flora
and/or fauna,229 though some states provide exceptions for certain
activities by state agencies.230 These invasive species laws thus create
a patchwork of overlapping governance for the management of invasive
species, at least on public lands. They also establish limited
coordination through hierarchical permitting processes and venues
for communication.
Third, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and
state analogues establish ad hoc overlapping and coordinated authority
over information generation and planning.231 NEPA requires federal
agencies to prepare environmental impact statements disclosing the
effects of and alternatives to any proposed “major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”232 It also
requires lead agencies to “consult with and obtain the comments of any
Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact involved.”233 Approximately half
of the states have adopted analogous statutes applicable to state and
local regulators.234
Fourth, the federal government coordinates with state agencies
through its funding authority. States receive funds through programs
like the federal State Wildlife Grants Program and the Wildlife

226. See Exec. Order No. 13,751, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,609, 88,611 (Dec. 8, 2016) (prohibiting
federal agencies from introducing any invasive species unless it determines “the benefits of such
actions clearly outweigh the potential harm caused by invasive species; and that all feasible and
prudent measures to minimize risk of harm will be taken”).
227. Id. at 88,610–11, 88,613 (requiring federal agencies to coordinate “to the extent
practicable” with other agencies in performing their duties, and requiring the council to create a
management plan for promoting “effective interagency coordination”).
228. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 3515 (West 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-292 (2020);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (2020).
229. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.921 (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (2020); IOWA
CODE § 481A.47 (2020).
230. For example, a few states grant agencies authority to propagate species necessary for
stocking programs. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1007 (West 2020); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.
13.01.03.100(01)(j) (2010).
231. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375.
232. See id. § 4332(2)(C).
233. See id.
234. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 n.7 (2002) (stating that
over twenty-five states have emulated NEPA).
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Conservation and Restoration Program if they adopt a wildlife action
plan assessing the condition of a state’s wildlife and outlining necessary
conservation actions.235 Consequently, the federal government does
influence state wildlife and ecosystem planning through funding and
coordination with states.
In addition to these more formal forms of coordination, a wide
assortment of ad hoc, voluntary, and/or less rigorous coordination
arrangements have proliferated. Under the ESA, for instance, a number
of local, state, and federal agencies have elected to contribute to
multiagency HCP arrangements.236 These plans provide sustained
opportunities for place-based, interjurisdictional coordination and
collaboration throughout planning, permitting, implementation, and
enforcement.237 But whether alternatively called councils, committees,
task forces, commissions, or working groups, most coordination
arrangements have taken the form of interjurisdictional networks for
coordinating information gathering and planning between disparate
authorities.238 Much coordination is extemporaneous, informal, and
voluntary; it simply provides opportunities for increased
communication between authorities rather than more rigorous
coordination between public institutions.239 Moreover, coordination
mechanisms are often focused on only a particular space or resource.240
As a result, robust interjurisdictional coordination remains the
exception and not the rule in biodiversity conservation, with most
authority over natural resources still exercised fairly independently.241

235. See 16 U.S.C. § 669c(e)(1).
236. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 302–06 (noting that “the HCP program's agreementbased approach to regulation” has been “instituted as a method for reinventing regulation to
address widespread concerns regarding the ineffectiveness and adversarialism of existing
decisionmaking processes” by encouraging meaningful participation by various stakeholders).
237. Id.
238. Camacho, supra note 182, at 29–30; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 41–45 (discussing
fora using “weak ties” to alleviate the effects of fragmentation).
239. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 222, at 1156 (describing considerable informal
coordination between agencies); Camacho, supra note 182, at 30–36 (detailing the limited efficacy
of place-based intergovernmental coordination mechanisms).
240. See, e.g., Christensen et al., supra note 145, at 682 (arguing for coordination efforts to
match the scale of a larger ecosystem); R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27 (1994) (advocating for a more holistic process because large-scale
ecosystem management has not been “consistently applied by federal or state
management agencies”).
241. Camacho, supra note 182, at 26–28.
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C. Trade-offs of Predominant Structure for Biodiversity Protection
Though there are undoubted advantages to this cascading
network of largely decentralized, somewhat distinct, and relatively
independent authority, it is also not particularly well tethered for
addressing many of the more conventional indirect stressors on
biodiversity. The decentralization of authority allows for the
development and application of particularized agency expertise,
strategies that are tailored to diverse contexts, and opportunities for
experimentation and cross jurisdictional learning by regulators.242 Such
a framework works particularly well for managing fairly discrete,
varied, and localized resources, as well as more direct biodiversity
stressors such as proposed human encroachments.
Decentralization, however, also has costs. In particular, a
largely decentralized framework is not well equipped to address
transboundary and cumulative harms.243 Of course, many of the
stressors that lead to biodiversity loss, such as habitat fragmentation
and invasive species, are paradigmatic examples of such harms.
Decentralized authority can also lead to lack of uniformity,244 such as
disparate treatment of species movement, which can either impede
valuable
migrations
or
fail
to
stem
harmful
ones.245
And decentralization might forfeit administrative efficiencies
from
economies
of
scale
available
through
a
more
centralized configuration.246
Similarly, keeping authority distinct over different resources
(such as public lands) raises trade-offs. On the one hand, it can
minimize administrative or compliance costs.247 It can also help limit
the risk of conflicting regulation.248 On the other hand, vesting
authority exclusively means there is no regulatory safety net,
increasing the risks of regulatory capture and under-regulation—
242. REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 34.
243. Id. at 36.
244. Id. at 36–37.
245. Camacho, supra note 159, at 1438–39.
246. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,
613–14 (1996) (stating that centralized efficiencies are more apparent in areas that are not “localinformation intensive”); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1495, 1562–63 (1999) (explaining the information-sharing benefits of this approach);
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J.
130, 148–49 (2005) (observing this phenomenon in a product-standards context).
247. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 222, at 1150; Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214.
248. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 222, at 1150; Jason Marisam, Interagency
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 223 (2013) (noting how the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) centralization helped unify Obama-era policy).
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particularly concerning for biodiversity loss, with the potential for
irreversible harm.249 A key advantage of ESA section 7—one of the few
relatively hierarchical coordination mechanisms in public biodiversity
governance—is precisely that it injects a safety net and anticapture
safeguards into federal agency decisionmaking.250
Likewise, there are advantages and disadvantages to relying on
largely independent authority in public biodiversity governance. It can
avoid administrative costs from coordination, reduce risks of
government inaction, and promote arguably beneficial competition
between government institutions.251 Yet lack of coordination is also
more likely to lead to regulatory inconsistencies over resource
management; inefficiencies due to the failure to pool expertise; risks of
regulatory failure from agency shirking, mission drift, and free riding;
and even a race to the bottom from intergovernmental competition,252
such as between states over resource use and exploitation.253
Indeed, much of the proliferation of place-based, ad hoc
coordination in public biodiversity governance is likely induced by a
desire to foster consistency and share resources and knowledge on
specific environmental problems.254 But because they are often
organized around particular issues or places, some of these coordination
arrangements actually run the risk of merely adding another layer of
governance, increasing regulatory costs without meaningfully
addressing the disadvantages of decentralized and somewhat
overlapping governance.255 As such, the baseline public biodiversity
governance framework is not especially well designed to address
conventional indirect stressors to biodiversity, such as invasive species
and habitat fragmentation.
D. Increased Overlap Through Climate Change
Unfortunately, the existing regulatory structure is even less
equipped for managing the alarming effects of climate change on
249. See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 41–43.
250. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (providing rules for “interagency cooperation” in implementing the
ESA); Jon Hasselman, Holes in the Endangered Species Act Safety Net: The Role of Agency
“Discretion” in Section 7 Consultation, 25 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 125, 128–38 (2006) (providing an
overview of the ESA’s history and arguing that “even agency actions that can be viewed as
‘nondiscretionary’ are prohibited by § 7 if they will cause jeopardy”).
251. REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 46–48.
252. Id. at 47–49.
253. See, e.g., Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 453 (2006).
254. E.g., POLLAK, supra note 148, at 6–7.
255. Camacho, supra note 182, at 36, 48.
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biodiversity. As stated earlier, climate change is compounding already
significant pressures on biodiversity that are increasing risks of
extinction.256 Rising temperatures will also cause changes in
reproductive timing and behavior, timing of migration patterns, and
shifts in habitat ranges northward and toward higher elevations that
will “fundamentally rearrange U.S. ecosystems” and “alter ecosystem
structure, function, and services, leading to predominantly negative
consequences for biodiversity and the provision of ecosystem goods
and services.”257
Yet climate change is testing the resilience of the structure of
public biodiversity governance in ways that are at least as troubling as
these physical effects. The pressures of widespread changes in climatic
conditions that are accelerating species movement also substantially
increase jurisdictional overlap between the many decentralized
government institutions charged with regulating and managing
biodiversity loss. As wildlife and vegetation respond to altered climatic
conditions over the next century, landscapes may no longer be suitable
for preexisting flora and fauna long considered “native.”258 These
species will have to emigrate elsewhere to survive, with many species
facing extinction unless they can move considerable distances to adapt
or their movement is actively facilitated.259 Relatedly, other—more
compatible and very possibly non-native—immigrants will be needed to
fill the niches vacated by those that emigrated.260
Yet the largely segmented and uncoordinated authority that
predominates public biodiversity governance was not designed to
manage these widespread range shifts, contractions, and expansions of
ecological resources that will blur the distinctions between legally

256. The EPA determined years ago that “clear evidence” demonstrates “climate change is
exerting major influences on natural environments and biodiversity, and these influences are
generally expected to grow with increased warming.” Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496,
66,534 (Dec. 15, 2009).
257. Id. at 66,498.
258. See Camacho, supra note 106, at 181–83 (describing the specific drivers and problems
associated with newly uninhabitable conditions).
259. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 158, at 14–15;
Thompson Webb III, Past Changes in Vegetation and Climate: Lessons for the Future, in GLOBAL
WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 59, 60 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas E. Lovejoy ed., 1994)
(discussing the loss of plant ranges due to climate change); O. Hoegh-Guldberg, L. Hughes, S.
McLntyre, D. B. Lindenmayer, C. Parmesan, H. P. Possingham & C. D. Thomas, Assisted
Colonization and Rapid Climate Change, 321 SCIENCE 345, 345 (2008). A leading but oftencontested article in Nature concluded that by 2050, up to two-thirds of species will need to migrate
or be moved to new habitats to survive. Thomas et al., supra note 53, at 145.
260. See Malcolm L. Hunter, Climate Change and Moving Species: Furthering the Debate on
Assisted Colonization, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1356, 1357 (2007).
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discrete lands. Beyond the limitations of the existing substantive goals
and strategies for biodiversity management identified in Part II,
keeping authority predominantly decentralized, poorly coordinated,
and increasingly overlapping will create substantial barriers to
needed migrations.
Climate change will make the difficulties in addressing
transboundary concerns for decentralized authority increasingly
prominent. And the additional overlap in authority due to the increased
pressure for species migrations will substantially increase the potential
for regulatory conflict. Species movement will be constrained not only
by physical obstructions to dispersal, but also by management
differences between jurisdictions. Vulnerable flora and fauna will need
to move from one designated land category to another, but the
management objectives of those new jurisdictions may hinder or bar
such migration.261 Regulatory conflict is also likely to increase between
these place-based laws of public lands and species-focused conservation
laws, like those governing endangered and invasive species.262 The
ESA, for example, might demand protections for migrating listed
species that other public lands might categorize as invasive.263 Left
unaddressed, the increased overlap paired with little or weak
coordination is likely to exacerbate some of the preexisting limitations
of public biodiversity governance.
E. Limited Interjurisdictional Learning
Unfortunately, public biodiversity governance is also weakened
by the general absence of any infrastructure for promoting
interjurisdictional learning and thus more adaptive governance.264 This
structural concern builds on the procedural one identified in Part III
regarding limited integration of adaptive decisionmaking. The focus
here, however, is on the lack of a centralized or coordinated framework
for generating, disseminating, or analyzing information about adopted
management strategies. Natural resource laws typically do not require
or otherwise promote the systematic generation of information about
261. See Camacho, supra note 106, at 188 (describing the factors that determine the legality
of assisted migration).
262. For example, if a member of a listed endangered species attempts to migrate through
designated wilderness outside its historical range, such movement arguably would be barred by
the Wilderness Act. See id. at 198–99. It also might be considered invasive under federal or state
invasive species laws. See id. at 199–201.
263. For possible conflicting laws, see, for example, the Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 77017786, the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42, and the Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act, 39
U.S.C. § 3015.
264. Camacho, supra note 159, at 1417; Camacho, supra note 182, at 50.
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the efficacy of programs and government institutions.265 While
assessments by nongovernmental organizations may occasionally
provide some relevant information, such analyses are not part of a
legitimating public process of systematic monitoring, assessment, and
adjustment.266 Nor is there any infrastructure for the broad
dissemination of assessment data, even among partner institutions
governing similar natural resources.267
As a result, the capacity of public biodiversity governance to
reduce uncertainty by learning about the effectiveness of past
management actions is largely untapped. Existing decentralized and
even distinct authority can be useful for providing avenues for
experimentation, tailored strategies, and learning. But these
opportunities for learning are wasted if there is no centralized or
coordinated infrastructure for gathering and sharing such information
more broadly.
This deficiency is of particular concern in light of the various
ways that climate change magnifies uncertainties for the management
of ecological resources.268 In part, this is because climate change is
bringing a wide range of changes, and often there is no readily available
past analog on which resource managers can draw for making
management decisions.269 There is significant uncertainty regarding
the exact local effects and efficacy of possible management strategies in
preventing or reducing the harmful effects of climate change. Climate
change involves more complex and potentially confounding variables
than most environmental issues, and localized modeling needed to aid
adaptation decisions is improving but remains difficult.270 But this
uncertainty is compounded because: (1) information about the
performance of adopted strategies is rarely ever systematically

265. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem
Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 955–56 (2008) (explaining
the failure to implement a program to “monitor, evaluate, and adjust” the titular program over the
last ten years).
266. Cf. Camacho, supra note 85, at 343–44 (discussing how requiring governmental actors to
systematically monitor and adapt programs not only provides vital information but also promotes
accountability and legitimacy).
267. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 495 (2004) (describing the
lack of “information-pooling” in HCPs); Karkkainen, supra note 234, at 946–48 (making reporting
and transparency suggestions).
268. Camacho, supra note 182, at 10–15.
269. Id. at 13.
270. See Camacho, supra note 159, at 1409–13.
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generated, and (2) there are insufficient avenues for sharing
information between existing regulatory authorities.271
V. PROMOTING ADAPTIVE PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE
Too often, even governance scholars who recognize the
challenges raised by complex problems like biodiversity conflate the
three key components of governance or only emphasize certain aspects
to the detriment of others. Yet the strategies, processes, and structures
of governance can and should be reshaped to better resist and manage
biodiversity loss.
A. Goals and Strategies to Advance Biodiversity
1. Prioritizing Ecological Health
Substantive conservation management can be reshaped to
better promote biodiversity in a changing world. Rather than tethering
biodiversity law to the preservation, restoration, wildness, or
consumptive goals that predominate natural resources law, climate
change necessitates managing ecological resources to more directly
promote biodiversity.272 This certainly does not mean that cultural
conservation goals such as historical and wildness preservation, or
more consumptive goals such as sustained yield, must be categorically
discarded. But their emphasis will be increasingly costly to biodiversity
should they remain a greater priority. For biodiversity loss to
decelerate, if not be reversed, the substantial portfolio in the United
States of reserved public lands and regulated ecological resources needs
to be reinvested more substantially in promoting ecological health. A
number of scholars have in fact sought to reframe restoration and
preservation to be less tethered to historical fidelity and more focused
on restoring ecological health or function.273
Of course, a shift toward prioritizing biodiversity and away from
conventional
restoration,
historical
preservation,
wildness
271. See id. at 1415–20.
272. See Bruce A. Stein, Amanda Staudt, Molly S. Cross, Natalie S. Dubois, Carolyn Enquist,
Roger Griffis, Lara J. Hansen, Jessica J. Hellmann, Joshua J. Lawler, Erik J. Nelson & Amber
Pairis, Preparing for and Managing Change: Climate Adaptation for Biodiversity and Ecosystems,
11 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 502, 505 (2013) (arguing for a more proactive and forward-looking
approach to ecological support).
273. Cf. Stephen T. Jackson & Richard J. Hobbs, Ecological Restoration in Light of Ecological
History, 325 SCIENCE 567, 567–68 (2009) (emphasizing the value of “predisturbance restoration
targets,” but nonetheless asserting that “[e]cological restoration finds new moorings in
emphasizing restoration of ecosystem function, goods, and services”); Alyson C. Flournoy,
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preservation, or sustained yield is no more than the initial judgment.
As I have suggested before, ecological conservation might be framed
broadly to promote some notion of future ecosystem function, health, or
“quality.”274 This might include biodiversity conservation, but also could
be understood as promoting the productivity of a particular favored
resource or set of resources.275 It might be realized as maximizing
aggregate biomass, though even so there might be various different
metrics for measuring such an objective.276
Defining, measuring, and advancing biodiversity alone as a goal
is also fraught.277 Measures of biodiversity commonly refer to richness
(number of unique life forms), evenness (equitability among life forms),
and heterogeneity (dissimilarity among life forms),278 but these are
overlapping concepts.279 If and how they should be aggregated remains
unsettled,280 with scholars offering numerous metrics for biodiversity281
and its conservation.282 Management strategies also might focus on
genetic, population, species, assemblage, or ecosystem diversity, or

Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 187, 195–96 (2000) (“[S]uccessful
restoration must focus on the functioning of the system as a whole . . . . This dictates a focus on
processes, not endpoints, and on systems, not individual organisms or species.”). See generally Dan
Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Eco-Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1173 (2003) (pointing out flaws in an ecological approach that is backwards-looking and concerned
with preserving a status quo).
274. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 25, at 555–56.
275. See, e.g., Casey P. TerHorst & Pablo Munguia, Measuring Ecosystem Function:
Consequences Arising from Variation in Biomass-Productivity Relationships, 9 CMTY. ECOLOGY 39,
39 (2008) (explaining that productivity is one important measure of ecosystem function and that
the current operational definition of net productivity is biomass produced per unit of time).
276. Id. (describing a variety of measures to estimate productivity, including annual rainfall,
oxygen measurements, standing biomass, and changes in biomass).
277. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
278. Cardinale et al., supra note 7, at 60.
279. Andy Purvis & Andy Hector, Getting the Measure of Biodiversity, 405 NATURE 212,
213 (2000).
280. Id. at 218 (“[B]iodiversity cannot be reduced to a single number . . . . We must of course
recognize — and explain to policy-makers — that combining these dimensions into a single number
would be arbitrary.”).
281. See, e.g., Matt Davis, Søren Faurby & Jens-Christian Svenning, Mammal Diversity Will
Take Millions of Years to Recover from the Current Biodiversity Crisis, 115 PNAS 11262, 11262
(2016) (asserting that phylogenetic diversity is a better metric of biodiversity than species richness
or functional diversity); Tom Leinster & Mark W. Meckes, Maximizing Diversity in Biology and
Beyond, 18 ENTROPY 88 (2016) (advocating for an entropy-based approach); Charles W. Fowler,
Maximizing Biodiversity, Information, and Sustainability, 17 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 841
(2008) (using the Shannon-Weiner information index to calculate the anthropogenic effects
on biodiversity).
282. See, e.g., Faith, supra note 33 (describing “safe minimum standard” for biodiversity as
an alternative to triage).
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some segment or combination thereof.283 And of course different
strategies might be directed at different concerns. Accordingly, which
particular manifestation of biodiversity conservation is adopted, and
how such a goal is measured and operationalized, will play an incredibly
significant role in the management strategies adopted—and, in the
context of global climate change, which species movements are allowed,
or even assisted.284
As I have also argued elsewhere, a focus on promoting or
prioritizing particular ecological processes in an ecosystem may provide
more concrete components to center on once the tether to promoting
native and restricting non-native is no longer available.285 A fertile and
growing ecosystem services literature emphasizes identifying and
measuring the beneficial services of ecosystems.286 These include
provisioning services (such as production of food and water), regulating
services that help control climate and disease, supporting services that
cycle nutrients and produce, and cultural services like recreational or
spiritual benefits.287
But even so, the measurement and prioritization of these various
different services for any particular landscape or ecosystem is valueladen and contestable.288 Public biodiversity governance and associated
academic disciplines (such as environmental ethics, economics, ecology,
and conservation biology) must accelerate and deepen the investigation
and discussion of how to measure and reconcile these many values and
trade-offs. A shift to a greater emphasis on promoting biodiversity and
ecological health is a necessary first step that would greatly facilitate
such examinations and debates.

283. See Michael E. Soulé, Conservation: Tactics for a Constant Crisis, 253 SCIENCE 744,
744 (1991).
284. See Faith, supra note 33 (“[T]he choice among these different biodiversity ‘models’ will
depend on what values are important to the decision-maker.”).
285. Camacho, supra note 25, at 564; cf. Faith, supra note 33 (describing how a focus on
valuing ecosystem processes arguably promotes maintenance and evolution of ecosystems
and biodiversity).
286. See, e.g., Christian Layke, Measuring Nature’s Benefits: A Preliminary Roadmap for
Improving Ecosystem Service Indicators 3 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://files.
wri.org/s3fs-public/pdf/measuring_natures_benefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F4W-BP9Y]; CLAIRE
BROWN, ABISHA MAPENDEMBE, LISA INGWALL KING & JEANNE L. NEL, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME
WORLD CONSERVATION MONITORING CTR., MEASURING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GUIDANCE ON
DEVELOPING ECOSYSTEM SERVICE INDICATORS (2014).
287. See, e.g., MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
SYNTHESIS, at vi (2005), https://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.
aspx.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD5X-48BX].
288. See Faith, supra note 33 (contrasting those arguing for valuation metrics with those
claiming it is “doomed to failure” (quoting BRYAN G. NORTON, THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES
202 (1986)).
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2. A Rigorous and Active Toolkit
Whichever manifestations of ecological health are adopted, a
reorientation toward more directly promoting biodiversity in natural
resources management would likely require a pervasive transition
away from primarily reactive and retrospective strategies toward
incorporation of more diverse and active interventions tethered to some
form of ecological health in light of future climatic conditions.
Promoting future ecological health in public lands planning and
management likely would include, depending on the land management
regime, a de-emphasis on maximizing consumptive use, preserving or
restoring preexisting assemblages of species, and minimizing human
intervention.289 Invasive species laws might curtail categorical
resistance to human introductions and non-native movement (while
allowing any native movement) and make the central inquiry whether
a particular movement is expected to aid or detract from
ecological health.290
The ESA and other species management laws should continue
but go further than the recent shift from permit-by-permit regulatory
hooks to more purposefully manage cumulative and indirect stressors,
such as invasive species or habitat fragmentation. Multispecies,
ecosystem-based, and landscape-level planning291 might provide
increased opportunities for addressing biodiversity loss beyond species
extinction, such as ecological vulnerabilities to non-endangered species
or habitat. Moreover, ESA recovery plans could be adequately funded
and enforceable,292 as well as address broader ecological health
concerns (such as biodiversity loss to non-listed species or ecological
functions not linked to listed species). But wildlife management could
go beyond trying to preserve preexisting biotic assemblages to manage
ecological change and transition areas to protect if not enhance
ecological health.293 This likely would need to include a much broader
portfolio of passive strategies than reserved lands or even
wildlife corridors.

289. See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 717–20.
290. See Camacho, supra note 87, at 900.
291. See supra notes 144–146 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., Justin Berchiolli, Stewarding Species: How the Endangered Species Act Must
Improve, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1079, 1081–83, 1085 (2020) (“Even if policymakers were to adopt
regulations promoting and overseeing species recovery, increasing the regulatory
burden . . . without equally increasing [the] funding may not translate to . . . progress.”).
293. See Camacho, supra note 106, at 228, 234, 244 (advocating for wildlife management
strategies that seek to not only protect and restore pre-existing biota but also to facilitate new
biotic development).
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Providing private incentives to promote biodiversity beyond
financial subsidies may also be critical. Some scholars have called for
substantially more attention to the management of private property
and landscapes and waterways between protected areas—the “matrix
lands”—to increase their permeability.294 For example, forests might be
managed in ways that leave higher densities of trees standing.295
Agricultural lands might be required or incentivized to maintain soft
borders (such as windbreaks, shelter belts, and filter strips) or
otherwise provide avenues for species movement or transition to
agroecological uses.296 Freshwater and coastal land management might
remove subsidies that spur connectivity-reducing development, restore
natural floodplains, or remove impassable culverts to allow for easier
movement of fish.297 And land development might be regulated or
incentivized to reduce wildlife impacts, such as through the use of
preferred plants, fencing, or wildlife over- and underpasses.298 The
challenge with this suite of strategies will be increasing the
permeability of lands in ways that promote valuable species movement
but also impede those movements likely to harm biodiversity.
But promoting biodiversity conservation in a world of landscapescale climatic changes might also require increased reliance on more
active, interventionist strategies in some contexts.299 These might
include assisted migration and translocation outside of existing ranges
to overcome large-scale dispersal barriers in light of anticipated
climatic conditions,300 and even perhaps build on past strategies, such
as captive breeding, to integrate biotechnological approaches.301 But it
is clear that the goals and strategies of conservation law can and should
be shaped to better advance biodiversity in a changing world.
B. Adaptive Processes with Presumptions of Nativity
Effective biodiversity governance also requires the integration
into regulatory processes of standards that facilitate species movement
and even introductions that are favorable to ecological health, while
limiting (if not eliminating) those migrations or translocations that are
not. In my view, this means typically rejecting essentialist
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Kostyack et al., supra note 144, at 714.
Id.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 716.
Camacho, supra note 106, at 247.
See id. at 233–34.
See Camacho, supra note 87.
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classifications that categorically protect movements if an organism preexisted, or because it is moving without direct human assistance.302
Similarly, both active introductions and movement of species outside
their historical range should not be entirely barred.303
Instead, public biodiversity governance processes should rely on
cautious risk assessments of the trade-offs of species movements.304
These might be in conjunction with rebuttable presumptions, such as
that the movement of an ecological unit is appropriate in locations
where it already exists or existed.305 Likewise, there might be a
presumption—but not a bar—against immigration or intentional
translocations to areas outside a species’ historical or current range.306
With or without default presumptions, adoption of
particularized risk assessments for species movements must be paired
with more adaptive decisionmaking. Just as the rigidity of public
biodiversity governance is well trodden in the literature on adaptive
management and governance, so are the general attributes of essential
changes. Many have suggested the need for integrating resilience and
adaptability in decisionmaking to manage the variability and
uncertainty of biodiversity loss through greater reliance on techniques
like adaptive management. These allow not only provisional decisions
based on existing information, but also incremental policy and decision
adjustments at the back end if conditions warrant.307 As adaptive
management may not be appropriate or feasible in all circumstances,
less rigorous alternatives such as contingency planning can incentivize
iterative planning and periodic adjustments and thus increase
procedural adaptive capacity.308
Instigating adaptive processes not only at the project level but
more programmatically is crucial, however.309 In my view, effective
adaptive procedural governance requires not only empiricism and
experimentalism in implementing on-the-ground conservation
strategies. It also necessitates more systematic monitoring,

302. Id.
303. See Camacho, supra note 106, at 200 (giving state law examples for potential non-native
introduction rules).
304. Camacho, supra note 87, at 897–902.
305. Id. at 902–05.
306. Id. at 903.
307. See, e.g., Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 203, at 429 (stating that the adaptive
management framework relies on “iterative cycles of goal determination, model building,
performance standard setting, outcome monitoring, and standard recalibration . . . .”).
308. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 188, at 1667 (discussing use of contingency planning to
accommodate data gaps in environmental law).
309. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 85, at 342.
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assessment, and adjustment of agency policies, programs, and
even processes.310
C. Coordinated Learning by Distinguishing Functional Authority
Both the wicked problems and adaptive management
literatures, however, have overlooked that the allocation of authority in
public biodiversity governance also can and should be transformed,
oriented more toward managing both conventional and emerging
indirect cumulative stressors on biodiversity. Many have pointed out
that the fragmentation of authority in biodiversity management
impedes its success.311 Those who consider it, however, too often
conflate different components of structural authority.
1. Disaggregating Public Governance
The allocation of authority among institutions can and should be
disaggregated. As Professor Robert Glicksman and I have argued in a
range of contexts, policymakers need to distinguish between three
different dimensions of authority: the extent authority is centralized or
decentralized, the extent to which authority overlaps between different
institutions or is distinct, and the extent to which authority is
coordinated or independent.312 As illustrated in Part IV, each of these
dimensions raises a range of trade-offs.313
Moreover, in both allocating authority and assessing the tradeoffs of doing so, policymakers should differentiate between the range of
implicated government functions—funding, data generation,
information compilation and distribution, information analysis,
planning, standard setting, implementation and permitting, inspection
and compliance monitoring, and enforcement.314 For example, the
trade-offs of centralizing information dissemination are different than

310. Camacho, supra note 182, at 76.
311. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in
the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2231–
42 (2004) (discussing the coordinated framework’s regulatory gaps, inconsistencies, inexperience,
and duplication); PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, ISSUES IN THE REGULATION OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS & ANIMALS 10–13, 18 (2004), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/
media/legacy/uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pages/reports/foodbiotechregulation0404pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZF9P-TYDQ] (discussing the coordinated framework’s issues of legal
uncertainty, regulatory gaps, inconsistency, and lack of coordination).
312. REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 35–49.
313. See supra Section IV.C.
314. See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 56–57 (discussing which functions
are better fits for certain organizational structures and how that can change over time).

2–Camacho_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PUBLIC GOVERNANCE & BIODIVERSITY

12/12/20 11:30 AM

1635

those for permitting.315 Similarly, overlapping authority in enforcement
can be paired with more distinct or even exclusive authority for
standard setting.316 And different forms or degrees of interagency
coordination may be employed for planning and permitting.317 As
illustrated below, attending to these distinctions can help policymakers
adjust public biodiversity governance to better accomplish regulatory
goals, including allocating authority to institutions in ways that
manage and reduce uncertainty and promote learning.
2. Reorienting Public Biodiversity Institutions
Any coherent effort to manage wildlife movement to limit
extinction and maintain ecosystem productivity and biodiversity is
likely to require tailored but vital alterations to public biodiversity
governance’s baseline of decentralized, increasingly overlapping, but, at
best, weakly coordinated authority. Introducing different forms of
coordination for certain functions can help promote intergovernmental
learning and address other structural limitations of public biodiversity
governance. Moreover, judicious increases in centralization for funding
and even standard setting on migration and introduction strategies
help tackle concerns about transboundary harms, promote
harmonization, and leverage economies of scale. Yet it also maintains
the expertise, diversity, and experimentation advantages of still
primarily decentralized authority.
a. Tailored Coordination and Centralization
Instituting forms of coordination over information dissemination
and generation, planning, and implementation—paired with more
centralized financing and standard setting over wildlife movement—
could help address concerns regarding lack of harmonization and
transboundary harms exacerbated by climate change. First, to deal
with the considerable uncertainty about the effects of climate change
and effectiveness of potential management strategies, there is a
credible argument that the federal government should develop a
framework of hierarchically coordinated information dissemination on
ecological resources. To truly promote interjurisdictional learning on
resource management, such a clearinghouse would have to include not
only scientific information about ecological effects, but also systematic
315. Id. at 66.
316. Id. at 98–100.
317. See id. at 120–23 (“Varying the extent of coordination among functions should heighten
the advantages of coordination while minimizing its disadvantages.”).
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reports on the past performance of management strategies.318 As
information generation would be undertaken by those entities adopting
and implementing management strategies, policymakers would need to
oblige resource agencies to regularly monitor, assess, and adjust
adopted management strategies based on their performance in light of
regulatory goals and targets.
In addition, coordination of biodiversity planning and
implementation would help reconcile the increased conflict among
ecological resource management authorities from the migration effects
of climate change. Increased reliance on mechanisms akin to some
already used in natural resources law might help manage the increased
intersection of authority due to species movement. NEPA and its state
analogs will continue to provide opportunities for horizontal
coordination of information generation and planning on the effects and
alternatives to proposed federal management of ecosystems.
Policymakers might even borrow from the ESA’s allocation of authority
and adjust such laws to require more hierarchical coordination of
implementation as well.319 NEPA and its progeny, however, only
contemplate coordination in the context of declared governmental
actions.320 In contrast, the fundamental question in managing the
effects of climate change on biodiversity is not how a proposed human
action may affect the environment, but rather how to manage the
indirect effects of climate change on species movement and biodiversity.
As such, proactive biodiversity conservation may necessitate
governmental planning in contexts in which direct human action has
not been proposed.321 A weaker, more horizontally coordinated approach
might be a collaborative infrastructure that brings resource
management authorities together to engage in broader biodiversity
planning.322 But interjurisdictional planning could be adapted to
require more rigorous coordination, such as required harmonization of

318. See Camacho, supra note 182, at 66.
319. See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 100–23.
320. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399 (1976). See also Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation
Planning and Climate Impact Assessments: Learning from NEPA’s Flaws, 39 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS
& ANALYSIS 10605, 10608 (2009) (detailing the process by which the acting agency must consult
environmental agencies with specific expertise).
321. See Farber, supra note 320, at 10607 (explaining how climate change flips the
reorientation of planning away from the conventional focus on how proposed human actions affect
the environment and toward how the environment may affect humans).
322. For example, the now-defunct Federal Interagency Adaptation Task Force was a modest
step toward interagency climate adaptation coordination. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg.
66,819 (Nov. 1, 2013) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017)).
However, it was almost entirely federal and not designed to prioritize goals or manage interagency
conflict, but largely for communication only. See id. at 66,819–23.
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strategies or charging a single institution with final approval. For
implementation, a more hierarchical coordination model might be ESA
section 7’s interagency consultation requirement,323 modified to require
consultation with federal wildlife agencies not only on endangered
species but also other categories of migrating ecological resources such
as invasive and other major migrating species.
A more centralized approach, with potential transboundary cost
internalization advantages, might involve the establishment and
prioritization of federal ecological management standards and
priorities related to migrating ecological resources. Similarly,
centralizing at the federal level the bulk of financing for migration or
translocation efforts might make sense. This might both take
advantage of the federal government’s superior capacity to pool funding
and provide a conduit for coordinating planning requirements and
standards with state resource managers.
Combining centralized standard setting and financing with
differentially coordinated systems of information generation,
dissemination, and planning could serve to proliferate opportunities for
information sharing and cultivate learning. This, in turn, should help
reduce the barriers to regulation exacerbated by uncertainty.
Furthermore, providing a transparent means for assessing agency
progress toward regulatory goals would help promote more effective
agency decisionmaking and regulator accountability.324 It should also
promote benefits in increased connectivity between lands through more
coordinated planning and standard setting.
b. Continued Decentralized Baseline
There are strong arguments for retaining decentralized control
of some functions as well, such as implementation of specific
conservation strategies with state and federal resource agencies.
Decentralized authority would allow for a range of management
strategies in implementation, which would facilitate the development
of specialized approaches tailored to local variations and resourcespecific circumstances. Furthermore, maintaining decentralized
implementation would continue to provide opportunities for regulatory
experimentation. To promote such management customization and
experimentation, the choice of concrete management strategies related

323. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
324. See Camacho, supra note 182, at 65–70 (discussing how a publicly accessible
clearinghouse would increase intergovernmental information sharing).
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to wildlife movement should likely remain with each agency delegated
authority over a particular land or resource.
Such decentralized implementation would serve to reduce
uncertainty when accompanied with the broader coordinated system of
information sharing. Requiring horizontal coordination of information
generation and dissemination, and hierarchically coordinated (or even
centralized) standard setting, accommodates the core experimentation
benefits of decentralized governance by allowing jurisdictions to learn
from the experiences of other regulatory authorities. The existence of
many different regulatory authorities provides considerable
opportunities for experimentation and interjurisdictional learning.325
In conjunction with pressuring regulators to learn through mandated
planning, providing resource managers access to such information and
communication will help promote the potential customization and
experimentation benefits of decentralized authority. Because such an
approach neither requires agency consolidation nor agreement on a
particular management strategy, making such information broadly
available is valuable whether agencies engage in collaborative efforts
or act independently in exercising their implementation and
enforcement functions.326
c. Judicious Overlap with Division of Primacy
Finally, though there are likely to be considerable benefits from
maintaining overlapping authority over transboundary ecological
movement for some governmental functions, there will also be
opportunities to minimize inefficiencies for duplication over other
functions. In light of the increase in interaction among jurisdictions and
the substantial uncertainty that accompanies climate change,
identifying a single regulatory scale for managing ecological resources
will remain difficult. A model of overlapping authority, with its greater
safety net advantages (albeit with likely greater inefficiencies), would
be particularly valuable for minimizing risks of irreversible harm to

325. Adler, supra note 246, at 137.
326. See William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and the
Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 353 (2005) (“Even if inter-jurisdictional
competition is viewed as a good, one can embrace allocation of such information-gathering
functions to federal actors.”).
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biodiversity.327 This might especially be the case for functions such as
planning and enforcement.328
Integrating hierarchical coordination mechanisms between
authorities, however, can help manage some of the potential risks of
inaction from overlap. For example, empowering an agency (such as the
FWS) with the authority to assess and authorize strategies proposed by
others—both measures for promoting beneficial species, such as
introductions, as well as restrictive management measures proposed to
manage detrimental species—can help ensure overlap does not overly
restrict ecologically valuable movements.
Moreover, though some overlap of authority may have benefits,
this does not mean that authority cannot be lodged primarily or even
exclusively to one institution for certain actions or functions. For
example, though it might make sense to allow the FWS, state wildlife
agency, and state land manager to be involved in endangered species
migration on state land, many of the safety net benefits of overlapping
authority might be reaped by overlap of only a few functions. All three
might participate in the information generation and planning process;
the FWS might be charged primarily with information dissemination,
financing, and standard setting; and information analysis and
implementation could be lodged in the state land management agency.
In short, though overlapping regulatory authority coalesced around
particular substantive areas may make sense for ecological resources,
such jurisdictional redundancy may be better focused on certain
governmental functions rather than perfunctory and full duplication for
every function.
CONCLUSION
For decades, scholars and policymakers have dedicated
considerable time to understanding and attempting to manage
incredibly complex problems. This literature has spawned a variety of
labels for these great challenges, with some outlining detailed
approaches for characterizing them. And though some seem to accept
inevitable defeat in addressing these issues, others have offered
frameworks for tackling them. Virtually all, however, have focused
primarily on the possible development of procedural mechanisms, with

327. See Camacho, supra note 182, at 66–68 (discussing the benefits of intergovernmental
information gathering on climate change); Ruhl, supra note 20, at 1400–02 (touting the benefits of
overlapping redundancy of “dynamic federalism” with regards to climate change).
328. See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 99–100.
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few actually distinguishing process from the substantive and structural
aspects of governmental authority.
Yet, at least in the context of addressing biodiversity loss,
attending to substantive and structural legal adaptive capacity, in
addition to procedural adaptive capacity, is critical. In particular, public
biodiversity governance processes must evolve to be more adaptive; it is
at least as important that policymakers integrate more substantive
legal adaptive capacity into public institutions. Express integration of
ecological health as a core objective of public lands, endangered species,
and invasive species laws is a start, but it also necessitates the
proliferation of more flexible and interventionist strategies such as
translocations and cultivating land permeability that seek to more
actively manage ecological change.
Similarly, policymakers also must consider the role of structural
legal adaptive capacity. Varying the extent of centralization, overlap,
and coordination by the government function at issue can better
leverage the advantages of different dimensions of authority while
minimizing weaknesses. In the context of public biodiversity
governance, adjustments to predominantly decentralized, overlapping,
and weakly coordinated authority are necessary to manage growing
transboundary risks, reduce harmful anticipated regulatory conflict,
and promote intergovernmental learning. Tailored increases in
coordination for information generation, dissemination, planning, and
implementation—combined with centralization of standard setting and
financing—might effectively address these concerns while retaining the
expertise, diversity, and experimentation advantages of still primarily
decentralized authority of implementation. Similarly, allocating
overlapping authority for planning and enforcement, but more distinct
authority to centralized and decentralized authorities (such as standard
setting and implementation, respectively), can provide a valuable safety
net for biodiversity while minimizing wasteful duplication.
Of course, these suggested reallocations are merely preliminary
possibilities. As there is at best limited information gathered about the
efficacy of different substantive strategies, procedures, and allocations
of authority, perhaps as important as the adjustment of substantive,
procedural, and structural authority is the institution of an adaptive
governance infrastructure that builds such assessments into public
biodiversity governance.329 More procedural and structural adaptive
governance, which integrates such analyses systematically into the
regulatory process itself, is essential. While calls for adaptive
governance have primarily sought to build systematic empirical
329. Id. at 235.
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evaluation of substantive and procedural strategies into regulatory
decisionmaking, more adaptive structural governance would embed the
analysis of the best ways to structure government—a learning
infrastructure—into the administrative state as well.330 To more
effectively tackle biodiversity loss and other complex problems—indeed,
to whittle away at the wicked problem of good public governance—
scholars and policymakers must try to reconstruct governance to build
capacities to learn from successful and unsuccessful ventures, using the
resulting insights to engender further reforms.

330. Id. at 236.

